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ABSTRACT OF THESIS
The rise in defense R&D expenditures since World War II
altered patterns of organization of private industry and uni-
versities; resulted in the creation of profit and nonprofit
contractors to operate government owned facilities; and spawned
a proliferation of nonprofit corporations to provide operational
analysis, operations research, systems engineering and technical
direction to the military services. The most controversial of
all nonprofit corporations has been the system engineering and
technical direction (SETD) nonprofits, MITRE and Aerospace
Corporations, established by the Air Force.
The purpose of this thesis is to provide a systematic study
of MITRE and Aerospace Corporations through evaluation of (1) the
conditions and events that led to their creation, (2) their growth
patterns, (3) changes occurring within the military and industrial
environment in which the companies functioned. The methodology
employed not only a literature survey but also a series of inter-
views with personnel in eight aerospace and electronics companies;
military and civil servants at various levels of the defense R&D
hierarchy; and employees of both MITRE and Aerospace Corporations.
The study revealed that the raison d'etre of SETD nonprofits -
that they were created to meet a special need which could not be
fulfilled by government, universities, or industry - was not sup-
ported by historical facts. The major technological advances in
ballistic missiles and SAGE were made by the organizations that
preceded the SETD nonprofits and the special need existed prior
to the creation of either MITRE or Aerospace Corporations.
Once established, however, the SETD nonprofits underwent a very
rapid expansion in manpower, physical plant and dollar revenue.
This expansion did not take place in research and experimentation
that offered the greatest potential for advanced technological
breakthroughs, but occurred mainly in manpower support for system
program offices for evolutionary weapon and support systems of
lesser importance and priority. The SETD nonprofits are being
used as a source of manpower rather than a resource of great
capability to be focused on selected and highly sophisticated
technical tasks.
The forces at play during the early days of the ballistic
missile program supported the Air Force use of an associate con-
tractor method with a separate corporation to perform systems
engineering and technical direction. But many changes had
occurred that made continued use by the Air Force of the SETD
nonprofits questionable: (1) program decision making previously
made by the Air Force was now being done at DOD level; (2) Air
Force programs did not have the sense of urgency and priority of
early ballistic missiles and SAGE efforts; and (3) industry had
developed a systems capability that was strong, capable and anxious
to perform SETD jobs.
The study showed that as captives of the Air Force, the SETD
nonprofits exist as appendages to the military bureaucracy. As
a national resource of scientific skills and expertise they are
decaying under administrative controls and assignment of technical
effort to projects of secondary need and priority. The writer,
therefore, recommends that the Air Force contracts with MITRE and
Aerospace Corporations be discontinued on or before July 1, 1968.
Furthermore, unless the Department of Defense can assign them
specific jobs of national urgency and importance, MITRE and Aero-
space Corporations should be dissolved or permitted to break their
defense ties to seek other governmental R&D tasks of national need.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
"Our purpose is not merely to describe and classify the
phenomena, but to conceive them as brought about by the
play of forces in the mind, as expressions of tendencies
striving towards a goal, which work together or against
one another. We are endeavoring to attain a dynamic con-
ception of mental phenomena. In this conception, the trends
we merely infer are more prominent than the phenomena we
perceive." Sigmund Freud.1
Initial Inquiry:
This study began as a result of what appeared early in my
Sloan Fellowship year to be an uncomplicated query: What happens
to a research and development (R&D) organization that is con-
ceived and established to perform a specific task after the
mission is accomplished or greatly reduced in scope and import-
ance?
The investigation began with one hypothesis; i.e., the or-
ganization obviously underwent change when its raison d' etre
changed. If an investigation were made of R&D organizations, one
might be able to isolate common change factors and possibly per-
ceive some recommendations for accommodating change. From a
"big picture" standpoint, this investigation might provide some
small contribution or insight to the larger question of the
organization and management of large scale research and develop-
ment.
From the very beginning, the study was directed to looking
at organizations that were involved in federal and, more
-1-
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specifically, defense R&D. My entire adult life had been spent
within a military environment, initially on active duty as an
Air Force (AF) officer, a few years with industry on an AF con-
tract, and since 1952 as a civilian member of the Airways and Air
Communications Service and its successor, the Air Force Communi-
cations Service (AFCS). The Command was vitally affected by
changing technology and the R&D programs that translated these
changes into military hardware. For the past seven years, the
problem of integrating new communication systems into the AF and
DOD operational environment had been my primary job responsibility.
The name, MITRE Corporation, frequently came up in correspond-
ence or discussion as being involved in communications projects
of interest to the Command. Initially, it appeared that a case
study of MITRE might provide insight into the initial inquiry.
The concern with MITRE soon led to an interest in the whole field
of nonprofit corporations working in defense R&D. It soon be-
came obvious that the overall field was much too broad and over-
whelming to be investigated in the time available.
Within the AF, MITRE and Aerospace Corporations belonged to
a group labeled system engineering and technical direction (SETD)
nonprofits. These companies were by far the most controversial
of all nonprofit activities. Initial review revealed that al-
though these activities were the subject of countless Congressional
-2-
investigations and hearings, special reports in magazines and
trade journals, short articles in books on management, no system-
atic study had been made of them. This study was hopefully
designed to correct this deficiency.
Defense Research and Development:
World War II demonstrated that our military strength was
largely dependent upon our exploration of science and technology.
The rapid postwar demobilization was based on a rosy-hued vision
of peace everlasting through a new world order of the brother-
hood of people and nations. This dream was short lived. For
the past twenty years a major national objective has been to
retain military superiority through new and improved weapons.
In this world system of power rivalries, science and technology
have reached a position of unprecedented importance in the main-
tenance of our national security.
The formal evidence of this importance was the creation of
governmental institutions and the phenomenal increase in appro-
priations for R&D. Federally financed R&D work increased from
100 million dollars in the late 1930's to over 15 billion dollars
in fiscal year 1965. It was estimated that about 60% of all the
scientists and engineers in R&D in this country were working
wholly or in part on government financed programs. The DOD's
share of these expenditures exceeded 7 billion dollars, or
more than 40% of the total R&D bill.
-3-
The rise in federal R&D expenditures in general, but partic-
ularly in the defense area, altered patterns of organization of
private industry and universities; resulted in the creation of
profit and nonprofit contractors to operate government owned
facilities; and spawned the proliferation of nonprofit corpora-
tions to provide operational analysis, operations research and
systems engineering and technical direction to DOD activities.
The system for conducting federal R&D rests upon a complex
partnership among public and private agencies, related in large
part by contractual arrangements. The implications of this
application of government contracting since World War II have
been noted by Carl F. Stover in a Stanford Research Institute
report:
"Once limited almost entirely to use in the procurement of
goods, the contract has now become a mechanism for securing
a variety of services as well, including especially scientif-
ic research and development policy planning, and the manage-
ment of government facilities. A pragmatic response to some
of the nation's most serious needs, the contract system has
emerged as one of the truly significant governmental inven-
tions of this century. A key instrument in establishing a
new partnership between governmental and nongovernmental
agencies in the performance of public functions, it is
intimately associated with many of the fundamental dilemmas
we face in trying to maintain a free and just society under
modern conditions." 2
The more than 7 billion dollars spent by the DOD for devel-
opment and production of weapons represent s the largest individ-
ual element of government spending. The distribution and award
-4-
of government contracts, the amount of effort accomplished by
in-house laboratories, the extent of effort placed in the hands
of nonprofit corporations are matters of continuing political
interest.
Bell Committee:
As a result of Congressional and public group pressures,
President John F. Kennedy on July 13, 1961, requested the Director
of the Bureau of the Budget, Mr. David Bell, to conduct a "broad
review of the Government' s experience in contracting with private
institutions and enterprises to provide for the operation and
management of Federal research and development facilities and
programs, for analytical studies and advisory services, and for
technical supervision of weapons systems and other programs ad-
ministered on a contract basis., 3 The President specifically
requested criteria that should be used "in determining whether
to perform a service or function through a contractor or
through Federal operations, including any special consideration
to be given to the nature of the contractor and his relationship
to production contractors."
The Bell Committee reached these conclusions: (1) existing
diversity of systems with varying degrees of interdependence and
collaboration between government and private institutions was
desirable and should continue; (2) this diversity provided required
flexibility and means of comparative evaluation between systems;
-5-
and (3) choice of system or contractual arrangement should be
left to the discretion of responsible Government officials.
In 1954, during the House Military Operations Hearings,
better known as the Riehlman Hearings, Dr. Lloyd V. Berkner,
then President of Associated Universities, Inc. stated:
"The problem of administration of military research and
development is relatively new because large scale military
research and development is new. Therefore, if present
arrangements for management are imperfect or not suitable
to maintain our progress well in the vanguard of the
enemy, the failure does not reflect discredit or blame on
our military organizations. Rather it reflects the develop-
ment or our understanding of what form of management of
research and development will work, and what forms do not
work, in light of accumulated experience with different
kinds of organizations.,, 5
Ten years have elapsed since the Riehlman Hearings and
three years since the Bell report. Each of the military services
and NASA have employed varied management approaches to weapon
system research, development and acquisition. A mass of claims,
often contradictory and conflicting were used by military agencies
to explain the rationale behind their use of a particular organiza-
tional management form. The comparative evaluation between sys-
tems visualized by the Bell Report has not materialized. The
advocates for the continued use of a variety of management organi-
zations follow a line of reasoning advanced by Dr. Simon Ramo:
"There must be flexibility in the ways in which different
projects are organized and directed. Projects vary accord-
ing to urgency, size, complexity, reliance on new science
and on components not yet developed and experience possessed
-6-
by government and industry with the problems involved.
Because all these factors have to be taken into account
each time a project is organized, neither industrial nor
government groups can afford to become fixed in their
concepts of hog the development of a weapon system is to
be directed."
Current Views of Defense Research and Development:
Currently, the issue of continued large expenditures of
funds for military R&D is marked by diverse and conflicting
opinions. In this connection, it is useful to recall some ob-
servations put forth by Roswell Gilpatric, former Deputy
Secretary of Defense. In April 1964, Mr. Gilpatric discussed
the kind of military establishment which might be appropriate
for the United States assuming the present trend to less troubled
relations with the USSR continued through the end of this decade.
He considered a 25% reduction in the defense budget possible, but
this reduction would not apply to R&D, as indicated by the
following:
"Strong efforts would presumably continue in research and
development, to assure that we were not left behing in
major technological developments that could upset the
balance of power between the blocs. Consequently, military
research and development expenditures would remain high,
such declines as did develop being the result mainly of
savings on the large expenses of final engineering and
testing of full-scale new strategic systems, rather than
from a reduction in the breadth of our research programs
or in pushing new frontiers of technology." 7
On the other hand a strong argument for reduction of military
R&D expenditures was advanced by Doctors Jerome B. Wiesner and
Herbert York, distinguished scientists, Presidential and DOD
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advisors. In a recent article in Scientific American, they con-
cluded:
"Both sides in the arms race are thus confronted by the
dilemma of steadily increasing military power and steadily
decreasing national security. It is our considered pro-
fessional judgkA.th that this dilemma has no tebhnical
solution. If the great powers continue to look for solu-
tions in the area of science and technology only, the result
will be to worsen the situation. The. clearly predictable
course of the arms race is a steady open spiral downward
into oblivion." 8
Military leaders repudiated such thinking and maintained
that the military need for new technology was greater than ever.
Gen. Bernard A. Schriever, Commander Air Force Systems Command
(AFSC),at a Northeast Electronic Research Engineering Meeting in
Boston maintained that Soviet and Chinese Communist scientific
and technical achievements posed threats to our security and
added:
"In the face of this continuous challenge we must insure
that we maintain the strength needed to deter war and
counter aggression. In an age of technological explosion,
the only way to maintain this strength is to push technology
forward. Some may not agree. They believe that military
technology is nearing the end of the road. I assure you
that this is not the case." 9
In January 1965, an Arthur D. Little report predicted that
during the 1965-69 period, "the production portion of the defense
budget available to industry will decline about 30% and defense
research, testing and evaluation. will decline about 15%." 10
The findings of this study will be discussed in later chapters
of this thesis; however, the A. D. Little conclusions assumed
that unfhremaen technological and political developments would
not change the overall military environment during the period.
Within Congress, many of the legislative leaders consider
that the nation cannot continue indefinitely to expand military
R&D at the breathtaking pace and magnitude of the past decade.
Representative Melvin Price of Illinois and Chairman of the
R&D Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee said
that 'Vke cannot afford to support every research and development
project which might be conceivable, or even desirable. We must
be increasingly discerning in the projects we choose to support." 11
Although the President had noted the need for improved
military weapons, the defense R&D budget continued to decline.
President Johnson's program for the "Great Society" called for
increased government expenditures in general welfare and health
areas accompanied by a decreased tax structure. Under such con-
ditions, the financing of additional spending for welfare pro-
grams must come from further reductions in military expenditure.
Many of the military weapons in our arsenal today were
the result of R&D programs implemented under the urgency of very
high defense priorities. Success was measured by performance
and availability rather than dollar or manpower costs. In the
environment of today and the foreseeable future, dollar costs will
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play a key role in DOD decision making and approval of a military
R&D project. Dollar costs must play a major role in the service
determination of the technical management system they will employ
to bring the weapon into being. The AF maintained that the best
method of obtaining military weapons and support systems was
through a management system using (1) associate contractors, with
(2) systems engineering and technical direction performed by non-
profit corporations, and (3) overall program control retained by
the AF.
Expanded Challenge:
This then was the background of the expanded challenge, of
new areas of interest that opened up as soon as the formal in-
vestigation of SETD nonprofits began. The AF expenditures of
approximately $125 million in fiscal year 1965 to support MITRE
and Aerospace Corporations seemae insignificant in relation to
the total defense R&D budget. Such a measure might lead one to
underettimate the importance of the SETD nonprofit role within
the AF. Their decisions influenced a major portion of the total
AF R&D expenditures and this fact led to the following inquiries:
(1) Where do SETD nonprofits fit within the overall frame-
work of defense R&D?
(2) Are the functions performed by SETD nonprofits legiti-
mate?
(3) Are the AF claims for their management system employing
the concepts of concurrency, associate contractor, and
SETD nonprofits supported by historical fact?
-10-
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The need for flexibility in managing diverse R&D programs
is generally expressed as a truism. Should such a statement be
accepted without investigation? Were the different systems used
by government agencies based on a systematic evaluation of their
worth or were they based on partisan whims?
This thesis will not address itself to evaluating the diverse
and conflicting opinions concerning defense R&D expenditures.
Instead these assumptions will be made: (1) our national security
demands that changing technology be explored to determine possible
military application; (2) defense R&D will continue to represent
a substantial share of the total federal budget; and (3) dollar
costs will play a more important role, not only in determining
weapon system technological approaches but also in deciding which
management system will be employed. If one accepts these assump-
tions, the inquiry may be further expanded to attempt to answer
the following:
(1) Is there a need to better understand defense R&D
management systems that have been or are still in
use?
(2) Is it possible to make a comparative evaluation of
these R&D systems to determine when and under what
conditions one system is better than the other?
(3) Is the present DOD management of R&D conducive
to technological innovation and change?
These questions are indicative of the fact that one cannot
investigate the changing role of SETD nonprofits without
-11-
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becoming enmeshed in the overall problem of defense R&D organi-
zation and management. Every effort has been made to stay as
close as possible to the issues directly associated with the
thesis topic. The implications of the investigation, however,
"are more prominent than the phenomena we perceive". 12
Methodology:
"It has been remarked as an imperfection in the Art of
Shipbuilding, that it can never been known 'till she is
try'd, whether a new Ship will or will not be a good
Sailer; for that the Model of a good sailing Ship has been
exactly follow'd in the new One, which has prov'd on the
contrary remarkably dull ... Yet I think a Set of Experi-
ments might be instituted, first to determine the most
proper Form of the Hull for swift sailing; next the best
Dimensions and properest Place for the Masts; then the
Form and Quantity of Sails, and their Position as the Winds
may be; and lastly, the Disposition of her Lading. This
is the Age of Experiments; and such a set accurately made
and combined would be of great use. I am therefore per-
suaded that erelong some ingenious Philosopher will under-
take it; to whom I wish Success." Benjamin Franklin. 13
Ben Franklin was the epitome of the enlightened man. His
pragmatic approach iLlustrated by his comments on the art of
shipbuilding, unfortunately, was not applied to the art of R&D
organization and management. No one has been willing to conduct
a "set of experiments" that might enable government to determine
when and under what conditions one R&D management system offered
greater potential for success than another.
There was no shortage of written material related to
federal and defense R&D and SETD nonprofits. The initial effort
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was devoted to historical research. The best data came from
hearings and reports of Congressional committees and various
governmental and private studies. Analysis of the mass of
claims and counterclaims with the historical record made it
possible to separate fact from fiction and helped to provide
a "dynamic conception" of SETD nonprofits through a better
understanding of: (1) conditions and events, the host of forces
at work, that led to their establishment; (2) their growth;
(3) their changing role as the AF position varied; and (4)
changing military and industrial capabilities to perform
major system SETD.
Historical analysis by itself, however, was inadequate to
provide a "dynamic conception" of the nonprofit corporation.
In addition, a series of personal interviews were conducted in
the Boston, New York, Washington and Los Angeles areas with:
(1) industrial concerns that had worked with either one or
both companies; (2) AF personnel at Hq USAF, AFSC, Ballistic
Systems Division, Space Systems Division, Electronics Systems
Division and research laboratories; (3) DOD personnel; and
(4) Aerospace and MITRE officials.
The next four chapters of this study are based on the
historical review and analysis and the information collected
through interviews. The last two chapters represent my
-13-
evaluation of the SETD nonprofits and my recommendations for their
future use in the total defense R&D picture.
CHAPTER II
HISTORICAL FACTORS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM
"Why then do we have nonprofit corporations?
"The answer, at least for those heavily engaged in defense
work is that they were created to meet a special need
which the government could not service internally, and
which was not considered appropriate for university or
profit making industrial laboratories." C. W. Halligan 1
"The common thread running through these accounts is that
each of the new organizations was the product of a particu-
lar necessity. It will be apparent also that in all cases
the responsible officials of government fully examined the
organizational alternatives and found them unsuitab'le or
actually to have failed." Gen. James McCormack, Jr. 2
The justification of "special need" is the most popular
explanation for the creation of both Aerospace and MITRE Corpora-
tions. In later chapters, the events that led to the establish-
ment of these activities is discussed more fully. It appears
from the record, however, that "special need" was a convenient
catchall that neither explained the historical background nor
the reason that the particular organizational form was adopted
by the AF.
It is unfortunate that within organizational life in
general, whether public or private, so little attention is
paid to history. Many activities, especially within the military
services, employ historians to document events and compile
histories that are filed carefully in bookcases but rarely read.
-15
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One could not help but be impressed with the wealth of information
available in published and unpublished military histories. The
cycles of events and the lessons to be learned tended to confirm
the old saying "there is little new under the sun."
If there was a-"common thread" it was not in the national
need but in the historical forces at play that one noted, time
and again, in the decision to establish nonprofits and in the
determination of their role. This chapter is an effort to
bring these forces into focus.
Role of Science and the Scientist in World War II:
R&D was not an important factor in military organization
prior to World War II (WW II). Field experience was the primary
consideration in the improvement of existing equipment and the
development of new weapons. The Army and Navy operated a few
laboratories; however, most of the military research activities
were accomplished by contract, under rigid specifications normally
associated with production contracting. These conditions permitted
the acceptance of few imaginative ideas even when good research
was done. The transition from innovation to weapon application
was extremely difficult because of the military resistance to
change and lack of understanding and support between laboratory
and industrial scientists and military leaders.
An illustration of this difficulty may be noted in the
-16-
development of radar. In the 1930's, radar research was carried
out by the Naval Research Laboratories and the Army Signal Corps
Fort Monmouth Laboratory, assisted by industry. While the
effort showed much promise, it found little acceptance by either
of the military services. The commanders at Pearl Harbor were
not even aware of the potentialities of ground radar and Naval
leaders were unable to see the tactical application of the air-
borne radar systems designed by Naval Research Laboratories.
Military tradition called for planning only in terms of existing
weapons.
Many scientists too, considered that it was not their role
to enter into organized political life. In 1933, the eminent
phyedologist, A. V. Hill, expressed this detached view of the
social responsibilities of science and the scientist:
"Not meddling with morals and politics: such, I would urge,
is the normal condition of tolerance and immunity for sci-
entific pursuits in a civilized state ... science should
remain aloof and detached not from any sense of superiority,
not from any indifference to the common welfare, but as a
condition of complete intellectual honesty ... If science
is to continue to make progress, it must insist on keeping
its traditional position of independence, it must refuse
to meddle with, or be dominated by divinity, morals,
politics, or rhetoric." 3
Prior to WW II, these three factors then were fundamental
obstacles to a successful program for weapon technology:
(1) Internal organization of the military services did not
recognize the requirements and potentialities of
science as an integral part of warfare.
-17-
(2) Military leaders, by training and tradition, generally
did not visualize the impact of science or recognize
the position that scientific research must occupy to
produce a successful program for national defense.
(3) There were no emergency pressures to force scientists
generally to recognize their social responsibilities
or military leaders to accept changing weapon tech-
nology.
The outbreak of war in Europe in 1939 led many of our
scientists to recognize that strong scientific support to
military operations was mandatory. The organization of the
National IDeleepe idsegarh e6miittemi in 1940 and the subse-
quent Office of Scientific Research and Development grew out
of pressure from the scientists on the Executive Branch of
government and not out of support from the military. Scientific
leaders such as Doctors Vannevar Bush, Karl T. Compton, Merle
Tuve, and James Conant recognized that the success of the war
would be dependent upon new weapons created by scientific and
engineering research.
The success of OSRD in marshalling scientific resources,
original thinkers capable of translating their ideas into reality;
in collaborating with industry in bringing early prototypes into
effective production; and in selling their ideas to the Armed
Forces was a major achievement. The success of the organiza-
tion was due to three important factors:
(1) Enlisted institutions rather than individuals. The
government contract became a new type of federalism
by which MIT took on the responsibilities for develop-
ing radar, California Institute of Technology rockets,
and the University of Chicago sustained nuclear reaction.
(2) Reported directly to the President and had the support
of the administration. The scientific community had
never been in so exalted a position with direct access
to the Chief Executive; a position exceeding any of
the military service chiefs.
(3) Authority and funds to support and initiate research
on matters considered essential to the national defense.
Under the OSRD organizational establishment, the military
was a collaborator and not a manager, director or initiator of
military system development. Collaboration was achieved through
military liaison staffs in OSRD offices, who could give advice
and guidance but could not control the direction of the research
office. The scientific impact on weapon technology and planning
was not always acceptable to the military.
"The OSRD usually found very great resistance to any new
idea or weapon while it was in the process of development.
The files are replete with statements of high military
authority concerning these 'ridiculous' ideas and, in
most cases, these ideas would have been killed had the
military been in control ... When the OSRD was able to
bring an idea or weapon to the point of demonstration and
successful tactical test, resistance to naval weapons and
ideas almost uniformly disappeared, and thereafter the
idea or device met with great enthusiasm on the part of
the Armed Forces." 4
Role of Science and Scientist After World War II:
After the war, it remained clear that the national security
would remain dependent on scientific research. In a letter to
-19-
the National Academy of Science, the Secretary of War stated:
"This war emphasizes three facts of supreme importance
to national security: (1) powerful new tactics of
defense and offense are developed around new weapons
created by scientific and engineering research; (2) the
competitive time element in dev&loping these weapons and
tactics may be decisive; (3) war is increasingly total
war, in which the armed services must be supplemented by
active participation of every element of civilian popula-
tion.
"To insure continued preparedness along farsighted technical
lines, the research scientists of the country must be called upon
to continue in peacetime some substantial portion of those types
of contribution to national security which they have made so
effectively during the stress of the present war." 5
In his report to the President in 1946, Dr. Bush presented
a recommended program for postwar scientific research. He urged
that the Army and Navy continue their internal R&D activities
but restrict their efforts to the improvement of current weapons.
The activities of the wartime OSRD should be carried on by a
permanent civilian activity, who would supplement the research
work of the services, and provide the innovations and technological
breakthroughs. This activity, he warned, if it were expected to
make major contributions must not be subject to the complete
direction of the military, and should have independence of
funds. A partnership between the military and civilian scientists
was necessary, but a true and effective partnership was possible
only if both parties were equals and independent in prestige,
authority, and funds. He wrote:
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"Military preparedness requires a permanent independent,
civilian controlled organization, having close liaison
with the Army and Navy, but with funds directly from
Congress and with the clear power to initiate military
research which will supplement and strengthen that
carried on directly under the control of the Army and
Navy." 6
Dr. Bush considered that this civilian organization would
parcel out the long range research involving application of the
newest scientific discoveries to military needs to civilian
scientists in universities and in industry. In this way the
"federalism by contract" developed by OSRD would be continued
and would enable the government to obtain the most competent
scientists to accomplish such tasks successfully.
Dr. Bush's advice went largely unheeded with the general
and rapid demobilization of the Armed Services. The Office
of Scientific Research and Development was discontinued in
1946, and programs were assigned to the Army and Navy for dispo-
sition. Under Dr. Bush's urging, the Secretary of War organized
a Joint Research and Development Board to coordinate all R&D
programs of the two military departments. With the enactment of
the National Security Act of 1947 and the creation of the AF,
the task of coordinating the programs of all services was
assigned to the R&D Board. It was made a part of the newly
established Office of the Secretary of Defense. The Board had
no power to initiate research programs on its own, but was
restricted to advocate those programs to be carried on by the
military services.
The Board was doomed to failure if only because of its
organization. It had none of the strengths of OSRD. The Board
carried out its coordination through a complex organization of
committees, panels, and subpanels composed of full time represen-
tatives of the military services and part time civilian consult-
ants from universities and industry. The civilian scientists
found themselves embroiled in service rivalries; engaged in
weapon improvement rather than weapon innovation; and subor-
dinate to the military. As Dr. Bush indicated in his report
to the President an effective partnership between military and
civilian scientists was possible only if both parties were equal
and independent in prestige, authority, and funds. The civilian
scientist in the R&D Board had none of these attributes. The
Board failed to achieve the primary objective of plugging stra-
tegic military needs with new weapon systems. Dr. Bush as a
member of the RockefOllerr Committee on DOD Organization in 1953
recommended the abolition of the R&D Board.
In testimony before the Riehlman Committee in 1954, Dr. Bush
voiced his grave concern over the great split in relationships
between military and civilian scientist:
"During the war that integration was brought about, but
under the conditions of war it was possible to cut corners,
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and moreover, the Office of Scientific Research and Devel-
opment during the war reported directly to the President of
the United States and had his vigorous support. Under those
circumstances it was possible to bring about a liaison, a
relationship under which OSRD worked closely with the
military at all points and effectively. Today we do not
even have good cordial relationships between the scientists
and the military within the Department of Defense." 7
Although there was general recognition that science and
technology were vital to our national security, in eight short
years the scientist fell from an active advisor to the President
and the prime manager of urgent weapon systems to a part time
and oftimes ineffectual advisor to the Secretary of Defense. This
decline may be partially attributable to the difficulty of extend-
ing wartime measures into peacetime, or the extensive reductions
in military R&D spending in the postwar years of 1946-48. How-
ever, by 1950, the military R&D effort exceeded the $600 million
attained during the last year of WW II and with the Korean inci-
dent began to increase sharply. This failure to retain or regain
the position of prominence achieved in WW II was due primarily
to military resistance, pressures and tactics.
Military View of the Scientist's Role:
The position of authority attained by the scientist in WW II
was unacceptable to the military. In the first place, the
weapon systems developed by the scientist caused a complete
change of planning and tactics. As previously indicated, most
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of the innovations were strongly resisted by the military.
The motivation underlying the almost inevitable opposition of
the Armed Forces to development of radical new weapons or tactics
is inferred by Dr. Elting E. Morison, Sloan Professor of Indus-
trial Management at MIT, in his fascinating description of the
Navy opposition to continuous-aim firing, which changed naval
gunnery from an art to a science:
"To these numerous innovations, producing as they did a
spreading disorder throughout a service with heavy com-
mithenhis to formal organization, the Navy responded with
grudging pain. It is wrong to assume, as civilians fre-
quently do, that this blind reaction to technological
change springs exclusively from some causeless Bourbon
distemper that invades the military mind. There is a
sounder and more attractive base. The opposition, where
it occurs, of the soldier and the sailor to such change
springs from the normal human instinct to protect oneself
and more especially one's way of life. Military organiza-
tions are societies built around and upon the prevailing
weapon systems. Intuitively and quite correctly the
military man feels that a change in weapon portends a
change in the arrangements of his society." 8
Normally, innovators have extreme difficulties in getting
their ideas accepted. But in the case of OSRD, the academic or
industrial scientist working in an atmosphere relatively free
from the adverse pressures of convention, prejudice, or commercial
necessity had access to the very highest levels of governmental
decision making. The military, who would be affected by the
innovation, were, for all practical purposes, by-passed. Mili-
tary liaison staffs could provide advice and offer assistance
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but, as previously indicated, could not control the direction of
the research. The fundamental strength of military organiza-
tion lies in the quality of its discipline. The scientific
innovator requires a substantial degree of intellectual freedom
and tends to resist the dogmatic direction associated with mili-
tary discipline.
The "federalism by contract" preferred by the scientist,
the assignment of strategic military weapon development to
universities or university type nonprofit organizations, would
place the military in a secondary role. Since the scientist
considered the weapon system in a national and not an inter-
service role, they jeopardized the existing structure of the
military services. The independent funding arrangement desired
by the scientist for weapon development would not only jeopardize
traditional service roles but also compete for funds considered
necessary by the services for the improvement and operation of
accepted and existing weapons.
The inherent strengthsof scientific effort represented by
an organization like OSRD were points of contention and a
source of severe irritation to the military. The termination
of WW II provided them with an opportunity to turn the tables
on the scientific community and regain their predominant role
in defense R&D.
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In order to resist outside control by the scientists the
military effectively smothered the advisory machinery of the
R&D Board by procedures and tactics. The military had the
authority to determine requirements, to decide what scientific
work was needed; the civilian scientist merely became the
watchdog looking for duplication. The research programs were
paid for out of money appropriated to the military departments
and administered by personnel within the military chain of
command. The civilian scientist working part time on review
committees was unable or unwilling to make basic program deci-
sions and deferred to the full time military representative.
The management system developed by the military used the pres-
tige of the scientific community to lend credence to their
actions but effectively left the scientist impotent to direct,
control, or even effectively advise the military of major
technological changes.
Military Use of the Scientist to Establish Roles and Missions:
The military did realize that science and technology had
destroyed the traditional basis of services organized around
strategic land, sea, and air missions. The Key West Agreement
of 1949 tried unsuccessfully to establish more realistic roles
and missions for the services. The traditional lines were
retained, however, and the gray areas bordering normal service
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responsibilities were covered in general terms and skirted the
issue of service responsibility. All setkices were mentioned in
the air defense role but no one put in charge; a compromise was
made on control of nuclear weapons with the AF getting sole
right to a strategic air arm but the Navy permitted to use the
A bomb against "naval targets"; and guided missiles were not
even mentioned.
The 1950's were thus marked by continuous, and oftimes
bitter battles by the military services competing for key roles
and missions. Each side enlisted military, political and public
sympathies in its battle for survival or supremacy. In the com-
petition, the AF saw in scientific research the essential key
to the development of its tactics and strategy in such a way
as to increase its own importance in competition with 6ther ser-
vices.
The period marked the beginning of large scale use of special
study contracts by the services. In Project Hartwell the Navy
asked MIT to investigate fully anti-submarine warfare and the
entire problem of maintaining transport over the seas. Hartwell
was followed by Project Troy, Charles, East River, Vista and
Project Lincoln Summer Study. Dr. Price records:
"By 1952, the military departments had set up so many
studies of this kind and were competing so strenuously
for the services of scientists and universities that the
Research and Development Board insisted that they would
have to get its approval before starting any new ones." 9
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Some of these studies saw good cooperation between military
and civilian scientist and resulted in strategically important
ideas for guidance of weapon technology. On the other hand some
of the studies resulted in serious differences of opinion between
the scientist and the military. Thus when Project Lincoln Summer
Study revealed a serious air defense situation the AF minimized
the ability of the recommended technology to solve the problem.
Several prominent scientists accustomed to a position of
authority from OSRD days began to carry on a public campaign
criticizing the AF for its failure to take advantage of new
"technological break-throughs" that would permit solution of
the air defense problem. This action raised the question of
the propriety of scientists working under military contract to
study a vital military problem and to report or advertise their
findings to other than their military client. There was no doubt
that the scientist was not content to leave his advice entirely
at the mercy of the military. He remembered OSRD days and
desired to play an active role in determining what was done
within the R&D program. On the other hand, the services many
times were not interested so much in advice as they were in
scientific support for their position of tactics and mission
responsibility. The battle lines between the military and the
scientist were drawn around whether the latter should be on
tap or on top.
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Army, Air Force Rivalry for Roles and Mission:
The National Security Act of 1947 created the AF, ironically
at a time of declining importance of airpower and rising ascend-
ency of missile power. Modern guided missile developments were
begun on a small scale during WW II in an effort to achieve or
exceed German Vl and V2 weapons. A Committee on Guided Missiles
was established in the Joint R&D Board, consisting of two
civilian members and not more than two members each from the three
military departments.
"Further, the committee was to prepare at least once a
year an integrated plan of research and development for
military purposes in the field of guided missiles; allo-
cate responsibilities between the military departments
for programs in this field; recommend means to exploit
critical resources and new advances, develop sources,
avoid undesirable duplication, and promote liaison,
cooperation, and direct dealing among engineers; and
recommend to the Board the funds required for research 10
and development programs and facilities in this field."
As previously indicated the organization of the Board pre-
determined its failure. Each of the services was in direct
competition for space and missile roles. No service was
willing to entrust to the other the conduct of its research
program. Since the Committee was composed principally of
service representatives, who were also the litigants in the
dispute, there was no independent judge. The civilian sci-
entists as previously indicated became pawns in this contest
for service supremacy.
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The leading personalities in this conflict were Gen.
Schriever for the AF and Gen. Medaris for the Army. These two
dynamic and dedicated individuals, however, spoke not for them-
selves but for the service they represented. Basic differences
in technical capabilities led to the selection of different
technical management strategies which played a key role in the
ultimate decision.
The Army "arsenal" system of in-house research and engineer-
ing centers represented the backbone of their technical manage-
ment system. These centers were not only responsible for modern-
izing existing weapons but also capable of developing prototypes
of new weapon systems. The latter were usually turned over to
industry for production of quantity needs. Although the arsenal
system used industrial and university study contracts to supple-
ment their capabilities, their in-house resources were capable
of performing system engineering and technical direction, ad-
vanced planning and basic research.
In their missile development program the Army used pre-
dominantly in-house resources. In 1949, the Redstone Arsenal
at Huntsville, Alabama was activated and under Dr. von Braun's
direction large numbers of experienced scientists and engineers
were transferred or recruited to this center. The greatest
in-house government missile capability was under Army control.
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By 1955, the Guided Missiles Division at Redstone had 3600
experienced personnel including 500 scientists and engineers,
many of whom had worked closely with von Braun and his team of
German scientists from the time of his arrival in the United
States.
The AF did not have an arsenal system comparable to either
the Army or Navy. It had a large capable group of in-house
scientists and engineers at Wright-Patterson AFB, involved in
aircraft development. This group had the capability to provide
assistance in missile development but they were busy in the air-
craft field and their leadership was neither concerned with the
future role of missiles nor assigned a missile/space role; and
the group was not systems oriented. It is probable that Gen.
Schriever made no effort to recruit the Wright activity as an
AF "arsenal" for missiles because the group could not be brought
under his direct operational control and its basic interests
would be split between advanced aircraft and missiles. Gen.
Schriever explained:
"In the case of the Air Force, it is generally true we do
not go to the other service laboratories. We know what
they are doing, but our development, our whole philosophy
has been one of going to industry and having industry pro-
duce for us." 11
The AF had no time to create new government laboratories
to compete with the Army. A new system, the establishment of a
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special private corporation founded entirely for the purpose of
carrying on scientific programs, was conceived. The AF proceeded
to rent its scientific strength by the contractual method.
By this new approach, the AF not only bought technical
competence but in the early 1950's it bought industrial approval
and support of their fight with the Army for the major role in
missiles. As previously indicated, the Army missile program
was an in-house program which employed a strong arsenal approach.
Industry threw its support behind the philosophy of Gen. Schriever,
which stressed "having industry develop and produce for us."
While they recognized some of the difficulties inherent in the
AF approach, industry considered them less dangerous than the
Army arsenal system.
Industry Void in Systems Management:
Our entry into the ballistic missile era marked a transition
in weapon system management - a radical increase in requirements
for competence in what has been called "systems engineering."
This term described the operations involved in engineering a
complex system requiring the integration of a number of sub-
systems, each involving a different branch of technology. The
system is tied together by the interface of the physical sci-
ences, principally physics, with all phases of engineering.
The systems contractor must be sufficiently competent in all
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fields of technology to understand the problem in each subsystem
and to make appropriate compromises between the conflicting re-
quirements for optimization in each area to order to get the
best total system. Such skills did not exist in any industrial
group or even at our major universities. It had to be developed.
The aerospace giants did not recognize the total challenge
of systems engineering and considered the problems solvable by
the production engineering methods they had so successfully
demonstrated in WW II. This fact was noted when Convair
appeared before the Scientific Advisory Committee in July 1954:
"Gen. Joseph T. McNarney (retired) and other Convair rep-
esedntatives outlined their management concept of the ICBM
program and made a bid for complete weapon system responsi-
bility. Committee members were not impressed; later they
voiced disappointment in Convair's standpat position and
expressed doubt that Convair's management structure was
strong enough to handle the whole ICBM program ... The
members left the Committee meeting with a rather general
opinion that Convair was not strong enough for systems
management of the Atlas project and that other airframe
companies also were lacking in this regard." 12
The changing role of the scientist in military R&D from
WW II through the 1950's; the military view that the scientist
posed a definite threat to their control of the R&D program;
the destruction of traditional service roles by "technological
giant steps" and the conflict between the military services
seeking power and responsibility in new mission areas; and the
industrial strength in production skills but void in systems
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management after WW II were real forces that played a vital part
in the creation of SETD nonprofits. The recurrence of these
forces, time and again, were noted in the development of Aero-
space and MITRE Corporations, described in the next two chapters.
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CHAPTER III
AEROSPACE CORPORATION
The history of Aerospace Corporation, which was organized
in 1960, can only be understood and evaluated in light of the
history and role of Ramo-Woolridge (R-W) Corporation, the first
technical manager of the AF ballistic missile program. This
history was fully documented in two studies by the House
Committee on Government Operations: (1) House Report #1121,
Organization and Management of Missile Programs, dated September
2, 1959; and (2) House Report #324, Air Force Ballistic Missile
Management (Formation of Aerospace Corp.), dated May 1, 1961.
These reports detailed the events leading to the creation
of Space Technology Laboratories (STL), a separate corporate
entity of R-W, and today a wholly owned subsidiary of Thompson
Ramo Woolridge, Inc. The reports were comprehensive and well
documented. It served no useful purpose to repeat the detailed
history; however, salient points were extracted and additional
data contained in AF files included in this historical review.
Early Committees:
As previously indicated, the role of missile power was
recognized, if not fully understood, by the military services
after WW II. The AF had let study contracts with Convair
beginning in 1946 to determine problems associated with long
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range missiles. The degree of effort varied between 1946 and 1952
depending on budgetary situations and military interest. The
heavy warhead weights posed rocket engine thrust and guidance
problems that were extremely difficult and beyond state-of-
the-art considerations. These problems made the ICBM conceivable
but impractical until the thermonuclear developments in 1952-53.
This technological breakthrough by Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)
scientists in warhead size made the practicality of a successful
ICBM more meaningful.
An ad hoc committee headed by Dr. Clark B. Millikan of
the California Institute of Technology was established by the
AF Scientific Advisory Board to evaluate the Atlas project, the
name assigned to the Convair investigations, and to determine
the probable future of this industrial study effort. After
visits to contractor facilities, AEC and AF briefings, the
committee gave the Atlas program a cautious endorsement. They
recommended continuation of the program under Convair's direc-
tion but did not accept the contractor's recommendation to pro-
ceed immediately to the design and production of a large tactical
missile. They advised acceptance of a three step development pro-
gram with military/scientific evaluation at the end of each step
to determine the desirability of continuing construction of a
proposed test vehicle or possibly proceeding directly with a
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prototype missile.
These recommendations were not acceptable to some AF people.
Mr. Trevor Gardner, Special Assistant for Research and Develop-
ment, who had worked closely with the nuclear panel of the Sci-
entific Advisory Board, considered the Millikan Committee caution
unrealistic in light of the Soviet threat. He considered that
the report failed to recognize the national urgency of ICBM
development and the implications of the thermonuclear develop-
ment. Mr. Gardner also felt that a part time scientific advisory
group could not provide the impetus required for the program.
Against the advice of military personnel in the AF, he urged
the establishment of a full time technically qualified group, to
work on the ballistic missile problem. In October 1953, the
Strategic Missiles Evaluation Committee (SMEC), consisting of
distinguished scientists from universities and industry, under
Dr. John von Neumann was established. The Committee was to ob-
tain continuity through the employment of a full time technical
staff.
Ramo-Woolridge and von Neumann Committee:
Considerable attention was given to the technical staff
problem. Three groups were considered initially: Rand Corpora-
tion, but this activity was eliminated because of their involve-
ment in other AF programs; California Institute of Technology and
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MIT who were hesitant to consider such a role but agreed to
accept the task only if no other resource were available.
Mr. Gardner then approached Doctors Simon Ramo and Woolridge,
who had left Hughes Aircraft that year with a few colleagues
and formed their own advanced research company, to accept the
technical staff role for the Committee. The scientists were
hesitant to accept the job for their company for fear of un-
favorable industry reaction; however, in October 1953 they
signed an AF Contract accepting the technical staff responsi-
bility for the SMEC or von Neumann Committee.
The von Neumann Committee report submitted in February
1954 advised that an ICBM could be developed and made opera-
tional in five to six years but not under current AF management
acquisition procedures. The AF had recently inaugurated the
weapons systems project office approach, which recognized sys-
tems management by colocating Air Research and Development
Command and Air Materiel Command project personnel; however,
systems engineering and technical direction -owe left with a
prime contractor responsible for the development and manufacture
of the weapon system itself. The Committee asserted that a
revolution in military technology had taken place. The acceler-
ated rate of technological change and the complexity of the
ballistic missile system interfaces in electronics, propulsion,
guidance, reentry, etc. was beyond the capability of Convair or
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any other prime contractor. The Committee therefore recommended:
"The most urgent and immediate need in the IBMS program
is the setting up of the above mentioned new IBMS develop-
ment-management agency for the entire program ... The
nature of the task for this new agency requires that over-
all technical direction be in the hands of an unusually
competent group of scientists and engineers capable of
making systems analyses, supervising the research bases,
and completely controlling the experimental and hardware
phases of the program." 1
Mr. Gardner had also reviewed Rand studies on the impact
of thermonuclear advances, that supported the von Neumann
technical findings. The Rand study further implied that the
increased centralization of R&D by Headquarters USAF, which
imposed layers of review and cumbersome approval procedures,
would have to be bypassed if the 1960 operational date were to
be met.
With the confirmation by eminent scientists in hand, Mr.
Gardner advised the Secretary of the Air Force that in order to
achieve the desired missile operational capability in the
specified time there would have to be a dramatic acceleration of
the program, and an organizational structure established that
would simplify controls and channels of communication. He
further suggested that two General officers be assigned to the
program who would be authorized to direct all military and in-
dustrial program elements and would have direct channels of com-
munication to the Secretary of the Air Force.
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Western Development Division:
On May 1954, the Air Force assigned its highest development
priority to the Atlas project. The Air R&D Command (ARDC) was
assigned full responsibility to develop a complete ICBM weapons
system including operational, logistic and personnel concepts.
In keeping with Mr. Gardner's recommendations, ARE established
a separate missile office on the West Coast, the Western Develop-
ment Division (WDD), with a General officer slot for its Commander,
and delegated its missile responsibilities to that organization.
Gen. Bernard A. Schriever was assigned command on July 1, 1954
with complete authority, responsibility and control over all
program aspects of the ICBM, including weapon system engineering
decisions.
Gen. Schriever recognized that the technical management sys-
tem he adopted for WDD would have to satisfy three groups - the
scientist, industry and the military. He was well aware of the
dissatisfaction of many scientists with their role in the R&D
Board. The kind of technical support he desired could not be
achieved if the organization wasaa anathema to the scientists.
The scientists, if dissatisfied, might withdraw from the program,
or in a more positive way might carry their case to the highest
levels asserting the need for a special organization outside of
military control to carry out the ICBM program. Gen. Schriever
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considered that such a move, if successful, would endanger the
military philosophy of research and development. He was
determined to design a management system that would prove
acceptable to the scientist.
It must be stressed at this point that the task confronting
Gen. Schriever was not only the development of an ICBM but, more
important, the attainment of a complete missile operational
capability at the earliest possible date. These controlling
factors had to be considered in developing the technical
development plan for WDD:
(1) Technical complexity of the project was considered
greater than past development projects, including the Manhattan
effort.
(2) Interface of varied engineering and scientific skills
combined with short development time schedule demanded strong
industry support and a broader industrial base than possible under
a prime contractor or arsenal management approach.
(3) Strong and open support by the scientific community was
necessary.
(4) Close and continuous integration between the technical
efforts of industry and the scientist with the military personnel
responsible for weapon operation, logistics, personnel and
training.
(5) Retention of overall control by the AF.
IFive Management Plans Considered:
With these factors to be considered, Gen. Schriever's staff
formulated and evaluated five possible management plans for WDD:
Plan 1: Award a single prime contract to one industrial
organization to manage and provide the complete development.
As previously indicated, the von Neumann Committee did not con-
sider Convair capable of dealing with the technical complexities
of the program. They consideid hat 1oaheirlacked across the
board competence in the physical sciences considered vital for
interfacing technology and engineering. Industrial organiza-
tions had not been successful in attracting or holding top flight
scientific personnel because of their failure to provide key or
responsible positions for them in their organization and the
imposition of strong controls over their research activities.
The hiring of top level scientists at higher salary levels and
increased levels of responsibility for this program could cause
serious personnel and morale problems, which an old established
company would be reluctant to face. In addition, the Air
Materiel Command strongly opposed the prime contractor approach
because it considered that the AF would lose much of its manage-
ment control. A large segment of industry also objected to the
prime contract approach for it severely limited broad industrial
participation. This method recommended by Convair was rejected
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on all counts.
Plan 2: A second alternative was to create a new large
laboratory within a university structure. While this approach
would make it easier to attract top level scientists necessary
for the R&D aspects of the program, it would not provide the
best vehicle for control and management of the industrial base
required for hardware development and production. There was a
great reluctance on the part of universities to accept the re-
sponsibilities of such a broad program. The military, too,
was unwilling to surrender management control to powerful
university groups, who had access to highest governmental
circles, and were considered undisciplined by military standards.
The staff rejected this proposal.
Plan 3: AF retention of overall systems management respon-
sibilities in-house was rejected because past experience had
demonstrated the inability of government to recruit the necessary
scientific and managerial talent through normal civil service
channels. Hiring at higher salary levels and with responsibilities
different than specified in directives posed Civil Service problems
that the government was not willing to face. Although a limited
in-house capability existed at Wright-Patterson, the guided
missile program would have to be superimposed on a thriving
manned aircraft R&D program. As previously indicated,
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Gen. Schriever did not consider this diversity of interests
desirable. The fact that the Wright Patterson group would be
outside of his direct operational control was considered detri-
mental to effective program management. Industry too looked
with suspicion on an "arsenal" approach and their support was
considered essential.
Plan 4: Establishment of R-W Corp., the technical staff
element of the von Neumann Committee, as a technical staff
element of the Commander WDD with systems engineering residing
in the hands of a prime contractor. This staff position role
was favored by Dr. Ramo because it not only permitted him to
retain good relationships with industry but also enabled the
corporation to stay within a reasonable growth factor. From
Gen. Schriever's standpoint this position was acceptable be-
cause the Corporation could provide him with outstanding ability
in systems management and engineering as well as important back-
ground in SMEC concepts. Doctors Ramo and Woolridge were lead-
ing scientific figures of great repute. Their ability to
attract academic excellence was demonstrated by the fact that
several full professors and university department heads had
accepted leave-of-absence assignments to work for the Corpora-
tion on the von Neumann Committee effort. This approach
appeared to have the greatest overall appeal to the three
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elements whose cooperation was considered vital to success -
the military, the scientist, and industry. However, it left
the position of the prime industrial contractor for systems
responsibility open to question. Mr. Donald A. Quarles, then
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Development,
after listening to a briefing on the above management possi-
bilities stated that systems responsibilities must not be left
vague but clearly delineated. Either Convair had to be judged
competent and given the overall systems job, including technical
direction of associate and subcontractor effort, or else R-W
must. be assigned total systems responsibility. If Convair were
considered competent, a small R-W group would remain as a WDD
staff element to provide technical assistance to Gen. Schriever.
As previously noted, Convair's capability to assume systems
responsibility was questioned by the scientific community. The
consideration by Gen. Schriever to broaden the industrial base
by using associate contractors for each of the major elements of
the system would also complicate Convair's ability to effectively
exercise total systems engineering responsibility. Thus, a fifth
management approach was developed and considered.
Plan 5: Establishment of R-W as a technical line element
of WDD with full responsibility for systems engineering and
technical direction. The relationship was described in this way:
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"But Ramo-Woolridge, a prime contractor on this regard,
still would be part of the Air Force family, operating
from WDD Headquarters and giving technical advice to the
Air Force. The Air Force would control Ramo-Woolridge and
Ramo-Woolridge would control the associate contractors ...
In this arrangement, Convair would be one of the associate
contractors, having important responsibility for missile
assembly, but Jooking to Ramo-Woolridge for the technical
direction and systems engineering which otherwise Convair
would have performed as the prime contractor."
SETD Relationship of Ramo-Woolridge:
Gen. Schriever described these approaches in a presenta-
tion to the Scientific Advisory Committee on October 15, 1954.
He advised them of his selection of the last approach and the
concurrence of the Commanders ARDC and AMC that R-W be given
systems engineering and technical direction responsibilities
for the ICBM program. One objection was voiced within the
Committee. Mr. Frank Collbohm, President of Rand Corporation,
challenged the wisdom of divorcing engineering design and
responsibility from the airframe contractor. He considered
that a number of companies were qualified and capable of pro-
ducing the missile. He questioned whether an independent
design group could achieve the strength of a design group
working with a major manufacturing organization. It appeared to
him that airframe companies would not care for the secondary
position and might refuse to participate in the ICBM program.
He stated that "a manufacturer who is given responsibility of
delivering an untried system which will work should not be
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expected to start with specifications and design concepts in
which his organization has had no voice." 3
Dr. von Neumann appointed a three member panel of the
Committee to consider Mr. Collbohm's objections. The panel
"rejecting Mr. Collbohm's views, reaffirmed the Air Force
finding that the role marked out for Ramo-Woolridge and
already in effect was 'logical and sound and should be con-
tinued' ." 4
Scientific committees provided the confirmation not only
for the technical direction of the program but also for the
management direction. This included centralization of budget-
ing, program planning as well as the functional activities of
production, procurement, logistics, operations and training.
Gen. Schriever was happy to accommodate the scientific recom-
mendations in establishing his organizational and management
guidelines for WDD since he was in complete accord with such
centralized responsibilities. In late 1954, the Air Force
signed the contract that gave R-W systems engineering and
technical direction of the ballistic missile program.
The prime consideration from a military standpoint was to
insure that the AF retained overall responsibility for this
complex project. The selection of R-W and its acceptance of
a line relationship permitted the centralization of technical
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management within AF control.
The organizational role assigned to Ramo-Woolridge within
WDD may be noted in Figure 1. In its line responsibilities for
systems engineering and technical direction as well as its staff
role for technical advice and advanced planning, R-W was an
integral member of the WDD military family. This approach not
only centralized AF management but also brought into the mili-
tary complex an unusually competent and objective technical
team to carry out many of the functions previously assigned by
the AF to a prime weapon system contractor.
The broad industrial base normally provided by the prime
contractor was now performed by associate contractors. However,
before the associate contractors could play their role, the sys-
tems engineers in R-W had to translate military system objectives
into specific design requirements. This involved assessment of
the state-of-the-art, engineering synthesis of controlling sys-
tem parameters, determination of competing system configurations
capable of meeting military requirements and then operational
analysis to determine a single functional configuration. The
system was then divided into subsystems and assigned to associate
contractors for separate, concurrent development.
Technical direction had to be provided the associate con-
tractors to insure optimal mating of the subsystems within the
FIGURE 1
AIR FORCE - RAMO-WOOLRIDGE RELATIONSHIP
Solid Line - Line Relationship
Dotted Line -Staff Relationship
Source: Hq AFSC
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total system. R-W held the technical direction responsibility
to work out with associated contractors the technical decisions
as to which subsystem characteristics should be modified and
compromised in order to achieve compatibility with the whole
and to provide an optimum total system. This role was described
by Max Golden, General Counsel of the AF:
"Above all, the contributions of the systems contractor
would be critical. He would be the technical overseer of
the many subsystem contractors; the arbiter of tolerances
and compromises among countless components; and the cement
that bound all together, into the optimum weapon system.it 5
The job required the gathering together of very competent
scientific and technical people in a variety of disciplines.
As previously indicated, Doctors Ramo and Woolridge were able
to attract these skills. It is highly doubtful that, at the time,
either industry or government could have assembled the same
competence or provided the working relationships necessary for
the effective execution of the ballistic missile program.
The management complex assembled at WDD was unique in the
DOD. All elements of the total weapon system were colocated and
centralized in one area: (1) the developer, WDD; (2) the sys-
tems engineer and technical director, R-W; (3) the logistician,
AMC; and (4) the operator and user, SAC. This military-scientific-
industrial team engaged in a radical experiment in weapon system
development and management. The WDD complex was granted greater
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autonomy and independent authority than had been granted to any
previous AF management organization. The AF placed full responsi-
bility for speeding ballistic missile development through to an
earliest possible successful conclusion in this management com-
plex. The remarkable results achieved in the development of
Atlas, Titan, Thor and Minuteman stand as a monument to this
system. The Committee on Government Operations report stated:
"From the performance standpoint, Ramo-Woolridge (STL)
along with BMD can point to the fact that they 'beat the
clock' and surprised many experts in getting operable
Atlases and Thors from factory to the field in so short a
period of time. There will be many - in industry among
participating contractors, in Government among rival
services - who discount the contribution of Ramo-Woolridge
(and STL) but this organization can take pride in is own
right for what it has done for the United States."
Conflict of Interest:
The AF/R-W. relationship was extremely successful techni-
cally but in a few short years floundered because of political
and economic pressures. Systems engineering and technical
direction demanded an objective and impartial contractor. The
original Ramo-Woolridge contract debarred R-W and its minority
stockholder, Thompson Products Co., from any AF hardware develop-
ment or production work; however, this restriction did not apply
to any ballistic missile contracts already held by Thompson
Products. Initially, this restriction did not overly concern
the company. In the latter part of 1958, R-W and Thompson
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Products merged into Thompson Ramo-Woolridge for the express
purpose of acquiring a larger share of the missile business.
The hardware ban cut them off from a major share of defense
contracts. The company also realized the potential of space
business. Space Technology Laboratories (STL), the R-W activity
now sitting in the line-staff relationship with the AF wanted
to free itself from the encumbrances of a hardware ban.
The initial support by industry of the R-W role was based
on the consideration that this system was less of a threat
than the arsenal approach. The growth of R-W and the new
Thompson Ramo-Woolridge organization posed a definite threat
to industry.
"The convention adopted by the Air Force of referring to
Ramo-Woolridge as its 'prime' contractor or as a 'line'
contractor on a par with other missile contractors, does
not obviate the fact that this contractor alone sits at
the very seat of Government, three or four thousand strong,
and wields an enormous influence on the course and conduct
of multi-million dollar missile programs. This influence -
there is nothing insidious about the term as used here -
is the more powerful because it is exercised in the name of
the Air Force. And while nrch emphasis is given to the fact
that STL hews closely to the line of 'technical' decisions
and keeps out of business and contracting decisions, the
other fact is that the technical decisions are critical to
and shape the course of the business decisions. In the
missile programs, technique is master; business is the
housekeeper.," 7
Thompson Ramo-Woolridge desire to expand its operations led
to a breakdown of relations with industry. To keep up with the
state-of-the-art, R-W systems engineers needed access to industrial
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scientists. Contractors were reluctant to furnish information
that might then be used by R-W for its own competitive advantage.
The objectivity and impartiality of R-W became subject to
question. Did the company have an axe to grind when they
defended in-house designed subsystems? The questions posed by
the changing nature of military and space technology, the
changing position of R-W, and the political pressures brought
to bear by industry led some to be concerned with the continued
effectiveness of the AF ballistic missile program. This concern
was voiced by the Congressional Committee that had studied the
missile program so extensively:
"The subcommittee believes that if STL is to have any
future with the Air Force, it must be converted into a
nonprofit institution akin to the Rand Corporation and
other private and university sponsored organizations which
serve the military departments and other agencies of the
Federal Government on a stable and continuing basis.
Government relationships with nonprofit organizations also
pose problems, but they are less important than the benefits
received and certainly less crucial than those posed by the
STL tie with the Air Force." 8
Mr. Max Golden claimed:
"Just as the need for an independent systems contractor did
not arise until the missile had introduced a new era in
technology, so the problem of his profit-seeking status did
not become acute until the space age had spawned still another
generation of systems ... The traditional prime contractor,
the independent systems contractor, and the nonprofit corpora-
tions are but progressive attempts to keep forms of manage-
ment abreast with technology." 9
This misstatement of fact glamorized space system needs that
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were basically no different from those faced in the ballistic
missile program. The space age opened up new vistas for profit-
making aerospace and electronics industries. A R-W willing to
play the initial role assigned to it by the military in 1954
could have effectively retained that position with the AF in
the space age. It was not changing technology but the unwill-
ingness of Thompson Ramo-Woolridge to divorce itself from
missile and space hardware that led to the creation of Aero-
space Corporation.
A change was required. Again the AF went to the scientists
for assistance. In 1959, a committee of scientists headed by
Dr. Millikan was appointed by the Secretary of the Air Force to
study the management needs of the AF ballistic missile program.
The Millikan Committee concurred with industrial and congressional
critics that the relationship between STL and the AF should be
changed; however, they insisted that the AF would continue to
need the competence that STL provided. The congressional
critics wanted divestiture of STL by R-W and transformation of
the organization into a nonprofit corporation. In his testimony
to the Millikan Committee, Gen. Schriever considered these
actions necessary.
"la. Complete independence of STL which dictates divesti-
ture by Thompson Ramo-Woolridge.
"b. That the divestiture be accomplished in a manner which
-U
could not lead to speculation and the concurrent
necessity for growth and diversification.
"c. That there be no production or possibility of pro-
duction competition between STL and the manufacturing
divisions of industry,
"d. That the growth of STL be closely controlled.
"e. That the arrangements insure against divergent
interests arising through conflicting private and
government objectives and thus eliminate the internal
and external pressures which create an aura of mis-
understanding and distrust.
'If. That the organization have an aloofness which will
assure the fullest measure of confidence and support
of Industry, the scientific fraternity, the Congress,
and the American public." 10
Thompson Ramo-Woolridge refused to divest itself of the
strong resource it had in STL and permit it to become a non-
profit corporation. The AF then acted to create a new corporate
body.
Creation of Aerospace:
In April 1960, the Secretary of the Air Force, requested
Mr. William C. Foster, corporation executive and veteran govern-
ment administrator, to head an organizing committee for the new
organization. The Article of Incorporation filed June 3, 1960
which incorporated Aerospace as a nonprofit corporation under
the laws of the State of California set forth the following
mission:
"The purposesof the Corporation are exclusively scientific,
as herein set forth; to engage in, assist and contribute
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to the support of scientific activities and projects for,
and to perform and engage in research, development and
advisory services to or for the United States Government." 11
The letter contract under which Aerospace was authorized
to supply services to the AF in fiscal year 1961 incorporated
this statement of the company's mission:
to aid the United States Air Force in applying the full
resources of modern science and technology to the problem
of achieving those continuing advances, in ballistic missile
and military space systems which are basic to national
security. The Aerospace Corporation is responsible for pro-
viding the Air Force missile and space efforts with an
organization which is objective, possessing high technical
competence and characterized by permanence and stability.
The Aerospace Corporation will provide a vital link between
the Air Force and the scientific and industrial organiza-
tions in the country with a capability and interest in the
ballistic missile and space field; and, the Aerospace
Corporation through its unique role, will help to insure
that ths full technical resources of the nation are properly
applied and that the potential advances in the missile and
space field are realized in the shortest possible time." 12
Space Program:
At the time of origin Aerospace became responsible for
ballistic missile as well as space oriented systems engineering,
technical direction and planning. However, to avoid disruption
to the development of the national priority Atlas, Titan and the
Minuteman programs, STL retained responsibility for these vital
programs. This split arrangement was to be transitional only
until the three large missile programs phased out. The responsi-
bilities of these programs represented a substantial workload for
STL that, although decreasing in size, exists today.
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CHART 1
STL MANPOWER UNDER AF CONTRACT
Scientists
Fiscal Year Total Employed & Engineers (MTS)
1961 2582 995
1962 2716 896
1963 2407 839
1964 1354 655
1965 1287 460
Source: Holifield Committee Reports and Hq AFSC
The retention by STL of the ballistic missile programs of
vital national interest and urgency led some observers to con-
sider "initially, at least, the newly formed Aerospace Corp.
worked almost exclusively on space systems." This emphasis on
space activity stemmed from a directive by the Secretary of
Defense in March 1961 which stated that:
"... research, development, test and engineering of Depart-
ment of Defense space development programs or projects, which
are approved hereafter, will be the responsibility of the
Department of the Air Force." 13
On May 25, 1961, President Kennedy sounded the battle cry
for the nation's space effort:
"If we are to win the battle for men's minds, the dramatic
achievements in space which occurred in recent weeks should
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have made clear to us all the impact of this frontier
of human adventures ... Now is the time to take longer
strides - time for this nation to take a clearly lead-
ing role in space achievement ...
"Let me stress also that more money alone will not
do the job. This decision demands a major national
committment of scientific and technical manpower,
materials and facilities, and the possibility of
their diversion from other important activities where
they are already thinly spread. It means a degree of
dedication, organization, and discipline which have
not always characterized our research and develop-
ment efforts." 4
Although Gen. Schriever, the Millikan Committee, and
Congressional committees considered that the growth of
Aerospace must be limited, the open season in space
effort resulted in a big personnel buildup in Aerospace
Corp. As a result of an initial "Memorandum of Pro-
cedure and Understanding" between STL and Aerospace re-
garding transfer of personnel, Aerospace obtained approxi-
mately 270 scientific and technical personnel and 1400
administrative and technical support people. As a result
of intensive recruiting, Aerospace had approximately
doubled their scientific and technical staff and had a
total employment of 3149 by the end of Fiscal Year 1961.
Within one year they had surpassed the employment level
of STL support to the AF, as noted in Chart 1.
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Changing Environment:
The creation of Aerospace came just less than six
years after the assignment of R-W as the SE TD technical
arm of the WDD. The "host of forces" at play in 1954 were
not the same as those existing in 1960. The most important
force that permitted the establishment of revolutionary
management techniques no longer existed; i.e., the urgency
and priority of the ballistic missile program was down-
graded as soon as the nation had an umbrella of missile
strength in being or in production. Then too, insofar as
Aerospace was concerned, the Titan and Minuteman pro-
grams remained as STL projects.
In 1954, too, ballistic missiles were associated with
a complex new technology. By 1960, while the technology
was growing, the growth was more in the nature of evo-
lutionary steps rather than giant revolutionary strides
in technology. The system was building on the old, im-
proving booster capabilities, integrating existing power
plants to provide greater thrust and reliability for new
and exotic experimental programs and improving guidance
and control capabilities.
The giants of the aerospace industry once the ballistic
missile program began recognized their deficiencies in
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systems technology. They began developing their technical
and managerial skill and sophistication in R&D. The aero-
space industry began to invest heavily in new facilities
and equipment. In the ten year period, 1954-63, the in-
dustry invested no less than $2.63 billions in expansion
and modernization. According to an Arthur D. Little report
almost all of this capital expansion went toward research
facilities. While the market grew only 75 percent, the
value of plant and equipment of the major aerospace com-
panies increased 300 percent as indicated in Fig. 2.
FIGURE 2
GROWTH OF NET PLANT VS. GROWTH OF MARKET
1954-1963 AEROSPACE INDUSTRY
SO ZULLIot
30-
5 5S s 57 58 59 fao (a ro2. (3
Value of Cost of Land, Plants & Eqpt, 16 Aerospace Co.
*--* Expenditures on New plant & Equipment, 16 Aerospace Co.
.-- e Federal Aerospace Market (DOD & NASA)
Source: Arthur D. Little Inc.
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Major administrative changes had taken place within the
missile program during the period. In late 1958, Gen.
Schriever was appointed Commander Air Research and Develop-
ment Command and moved from Los Angeles to Andrews AF Base.
He carried with him an aura of success for the ballistic
missile program. His new staff was anxious to get on the
"bandwagon of success". ARDC began the process of reorgani-
zation designed to put into practice throughout the weanon
systems management area many of the things learned in the
management of the ballistic missile program.
There were some within the WDD system who were greatly
concerned lest the study groun appointed at ARDC see in
the WDD example a workable solution to the overall manage-
ment problem of systems acquisition throughout the AF. The
procedures adopted by the ballistic missile program con-
ceivably were ad hoc procedures addressed to a specific
situation and not meant to be of general application. These
people considered that the special procedures in a real
sense were not a management system and should not be
institutionalized as such.
Gen. Schriever however, retained the strong conviction
that for each new complex system a highly comnetent and ob-
jective technical and management groun must be established.
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To reduce the long time cycle from concept to weapon, in his
mind, required centralization not only of technical manage-
ment but also of funding, budgeting, procurement, pro-
gramming and all related activities under a single manager
If the WDD experience were valid, its institutionalization
would permit a unified direction of technically related
weapon systems.
The result was the establishment of Air Force Systems
Command (AFSC) in April 1961, created from the former ARDC
and the systems procurement and production organizations
that were assigned formerly to AMC. AFSC responsibilities
for systems acquisition covered the broad areas from applied
research through production. The Command established four
Droduct or system divisions responsible for systems manage-
ment: Aeronautical Systems Division (ASD), Electronic Sys-
tems Division (ESD), Ballistic Systems Division (BSD), and
Space Systems Division (SSD). Each of these divisions excent
ASD was technically supported by a supporting contractor.
FIGURE 3
AFSC SYSTEM DIVISION SUPPORT
BSD SSD ASD
STL sAerospace ITRfE SS
Source: Hq AFSC
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The WDD management system which had been given greater
autonomy and independent authority than had been granted to
any previous AF management organization was institutionalized
into the AFSC Management Concept for Systems Acquisition.
The system program office, the system program direction,
the system package program - all of these elements were
carefully spelled out in the 375 series of AF Regulations:
"to insure uniformity, completeness, and ease of review."
One AF officer stated at the Holifield hearings:
... 375 series is in essence a description of how to
conduct a program including its documentation. It
generally follows the format laid down in the ICBM pro-
gram, and was extended to all Air Force programs prior
to the time that the Hitch package program came into
existence." 15
The higher level budgetary, reporting, and management
controls that were not applicable to WDD duting the initial
stages of the ballistic missile program, were reinstated
when Aerospace was established. To protect themselves from
Congressional critics, the AF described in detail Aerospace
responsibilities and documented AF/Aerospace relationships.
Memoranda of understanding were also prepared spelling out
in detail relationships in systems engineering and technical
direction, technical planning and research.
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Aerospace Role:
In his testimony before the Holifield Committee on August 7,
1962, Dr. Getting, President of Aerospace listed "several
fundamental forces working to insure such successes as
we have enjoyed to date": 16
(1) AF need and awareness of the need for the
architect-engineer services in areas of advanced ballistic
missile and space systems. The Aerospace concept shown
inFigure 4 was similar to the R-W relationship, shown
in Figure 1.
(2) Complexity and magnitude of the task attracted
accomplished scientists and engineers, who came almost
entirely from industry. This fact was substantiated in
1964 as noted in Chart 2.
(3) "The real strength of Aerospace Corp. is its technical
manpower", Dr. Getting stated, and this fact was supported
by the high educational level noted in Chart 3.
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CHART 2
SOURCES OF AEROSPACE TECHNICAL MANPOWER
AS OF SEPT. 27, 1964
SOURCE PERCENT
STL 22.5
North American Aviation 6.9
Hughes 4.4
General Dynamics 5.0
Lockheed 5.0
Northrop 4.3
Douglas 4.0
Martin-Marietta 2.8
Aerojet 2.0
Aeroneitronic 1.6
GE 1.4
RCA 1.3
Bendix 1.2
Other Firms With Less Than 1% 24.2
Nonprofits 2.9
Government 1.9
Faculty 1.7
New Graduates 6.9
Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100.0
Source: Aerospace Corp.
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CHART 3
EDUCATIONAL LEVEL - AEROSPACE TECHNICAL STAFF
AS OF JUNE 28, 1964
DEGREE PERCENT
B.S. 48
M.S. 34
Ph. D. 16
No Degree 2
Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
Source: Aerospace Corp.
How does one go about comparing the ballistic missile effort
of 1954-60 with that effort assigned or accomplished by Aero-
space since its establishment? A quantitative method of
evaluating weapon system importance was not available in the
literature studied. From a subjective standpoint, there was
no disagreement within government, industry, or the nonprofits
that the urgency and priority of the initial ballistic missile
programs has not been met by any of the programs assigned or
contemplated for Aerospace Corporation.
The Atlas, Titan, Thor and Minuteman programs, that were
monuments of pre-Aerospace AF success, were characterized by
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the following conditions:
(1) Project of national importance and highest priority.
(2) Extreme urgency requiring a crash program and justi-
fying high priority and flexibility in channeling resources.
(3) Giant step in technology.
(4) Radical impact on military operational techniques.
(5) Concurrency of development, production, and operational
preparation.
In his testimony before the Holifield Committee in 1962,
Dr. Getting briefly discussed the technical work performed by
the Corporation during its first two years of service. Key
sentences have been extracted from this testimony and words and
phrases considered meaningful in evaluating the nature of their
effort have been underlined. 17
In the space booster area, studies and analyses included
work on Project Phoenix, conception of a flexible family of
relatively low cost large space boosters; NASA contract to assist
the Large Launch Vehicle Planning Group to define a coordinated
national booster development program; and Titan III feasibility
concepts. In the area of standard launch vehicles, the
corporation provided technical support for Thor, Thor-Ablestar,
Atlas, and Atlas-Agena vehicles. In the ballistic missile area,
the corporation conducted feasibility studies of future ICBM
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general systems engineering of the N.IKI-ZEUS targets, including
launch, a system within the overall systems cognizance of the
Army and Western Electric Co.
In the manned space flight, the corporation provided valuable
assistance to NASA in the success of Project Mercury through
general systems engineering and modification of the Atlas booster;
general systems engineering for the Gemini booster which will
employ the AF Titan II; and studied intensively the functions
and military requirements of man in space. In satellite systems,
Aerospace assisted in the launch of Navy navigational satellites
launched by Thor-Ablestar boosters; established the feasibility
of medium altitude, random orbit communications satellite systems
to satisfy military requirements; investigated a continuous,
synchronous communications satellite system; upgraded AF's
worldwide space tracking network.
In 1954-58, the ballistic missile program met the criteria
for "special need." What.was the "special need" of the 1960's?
The space effortsof national importance and priority were
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programs; conducted theoretical and experimental investigations
of reentry; developed a basis of a greatly improved missile
detection system using infrared detection measured by a rocket-
borne radiometer conceived and designed by laboratory personnel
established a mobile midrange ballistic missile (MMRBM) program
;
;
assigned to NASA. From Dr. Getting's testimony, Aerospace
appeared to be a helper not a prime mover. From the very start
of Aerospace, the AF did not have a "product" of national urgency
that Aerospace could tie its coat-tail to.
The same situation was noted in reviewing the Aerospace
progress report for 1964. This report, dated November 12, 1964,
contained the same words "to assist", "provide technical support",
"provide technical assistance." Again one could not find an
AF-Aerospace responsibility for a "product" of national priority
and urgency. Three major programs pursued by Aerospace, Titan
III, Manned Orbital Laboratory (MOL), and midrange ballistic
missile program (MMRBM) received setbacks at DOD level. The
MMRBM program was cancelled and the other systems were kept in
limbo for continued study. Much of the Aerospace effort provided
assistance to NASA, other military services, and DOD activities.
An illustration of the intricate interlace of responsibilities
that can exist in a national program may be noted from the open-
ing paragraph of a recent magazine article describing responsi-
bilities in the interim military communication satellite program:
"SSD is the executive agent for producing the system and
launching it; Aerospace Corp. is providing general systems
engineering and technical direction - Army Satellite Communi-
cations Agency, Ft. Monmouth, N.J., has responsibility for
system ground station, and Defense Communications Agency is
coordinating and integrating the total program. TRW Space
Technology Laboratories is a major subcontractor to Philco. 1 18
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The probability that the AF-Aerospace team will be assigned
programs comparable to Atlas, Titan and Minuteman in the
immediate or distant future tis very dim. The lack of urgency
and the reduction in key AF and NASA programs in space and
missiles in the national program was reflected in President
Johnson's 1965 budget submitted to Congress in January 1965.
Articles appearing in aerospace and electronics trade publica-
tions warned indnstry:
"If industry anticipates any major new programs or bold
new steps in space exploration, it won't find them in
President Johnson's mild-mannered $5.26 billion proposal
for space agency operations in fiscal 1966, starting
July 1
" ... the new budget slams the door on three big propulsion
programs that have cost the taxpayers an estimated $115
million ...
"Communications satellite funds took a big dip - $2.8
million for the year beginning July 1, compared to $8
million being spent in the current fiscal period." 19
In a recent article "The Air Force Role in Space", Mr.
Eugene Zuckert, Secretary of the AF, discussed the fact that
AF pioneering in missile technology provided the technological
base for our efforts to land a man on the moon this decade and
also spawned the great aerospace industry of today, He made
this comment:
"Even though we have 10 technologically explosive years
behind us during which we amassed a great amount of new
knowledge and gained much experience with new, fantastically
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complex systems, we still have no manual or other guide to
work by. We must continue to apply our best technical
judgement, test its validity and build experience. This
painstaking process has produced results and will continue
to do so.
"The 'building block' philosophy which evolved is aimed at
creating a stable of major components. These boosters,
guidance systems, and command and control systems can be
used for various payloads". 20
The ballistic missile effort of the 1950's was revolutionary -
to accomplish either tasks that had not been done before or, if
not new, with accuracy and reliability not even considered
possible. The effort today in space and ballistic missiles is
doing something which has been done before, possibly slightly
better or with departures from the past - it is basically an
evolutionary process of a 'building block' philosophy as ex-
plained by Mr. Zuckert.
Even with this less meaningful role, if urgency and national
priority can be used as a criteria, the AF use of Aerospace
technical manpower increased yearly. This increase was even
evident in recent years when the dollar income has leveled off.
The leveling off, however, was the result of Congressional
pressures to limit growth rather than the desires of the systems
program officers at SSD and BSD. The military system program
offices stated requirements for Aerospace scientific and technical
personnel increased annually but screening by the AF contract
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management office at Aerospace limited growth in accordance with
directed Hq AFSC directed budgetary figures.
CHART 4
AEROSPACE INCOME
Fiscal Year
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965 (Est)
Total Income
Incl Fee
34,264,910
61,340,227
75,777,697
79,069,349
78,000,000*
Total AF
Funding
32.0
49.6
67.2
70.5
68.7
AF Line
Item
28.4
31.5
31.7
30.0
30.0
Source: Hq AFSC
*Source: 1964 Progress Report Aerospace Corporation
Fiscal Year
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
Source: Hq AFSC
CHART 5
AEROSPACE MANPOWER GROWTH
Total Employment
3149
3721
4559
4337
4236
Scientists &
Engineers (MTS)
608
631
1100
1275
1307
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Other AF
Funds
3.6
18.1
35.5
40.5
38.7
Fee
1.5
2.8
3.7
4.3
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CHART 6
COMBINED AEROSPACE & STL MANPOWER SUPPORT TO THE AIR FORCE
Scientists &
Fiscal Year Total Manpower Engineers (MTS)
1961 5731 1603
1962 6437 1527
1963 6966 1939
1964 5691 1930
1965 5523 1767
Source: Charts 1 and 3
The 1964 Progress Report of Aerospace Corporation stated
that "the Corporation conducts basic and applied research pro-
jects which contribute to the Nation's store of knowledge in
space science and technology, and which enhance the Corporation's
ability to assess and apply the potential of new discoveries." 21
It was interesting to note that the percentage of MTS applied
to research and experimentation declined annually. (Chart 7)
Another indication of the technical staff mix of the corpora-
tion may be noted in Figure 5, which shows the percentage of
staff engaged in SETD effort. At the same time a review of
"Other AF Funds" column of Chart 4 provides a dollar indication
of Aerospace support for missile and space projects.
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CHART 7
AEROSPACE RESEARCH AND EXPERIMENTATION (R&E)
MTS
Fiscal Year* (R&E) % Total Direct MTS
1961 32 16.5
1962 110 14.0
1963 150 12.5
1964 140 10.0
1965 156 9.0
Source: Aerospace Corporation
*At beginning of 3rd quarter.
Until 1965, the history of Aerospace was marked by steady
growth in dollar volume and personnel; growing emphasis on the
SETD aspects of the business; evolutionary rather than revolu-
tionary steps in technology; development of large industrial
resources for systems management; and a period marked by
feasibility studies and program planning of potentially large
space and missile programs but no DOD funding approval to imple-
ment a program of national urgency and priority. The Corporation
accomplished the jobs assigned to it by the AF, but it could not
point to "monuments of success" that were the hall-marks of the
early ballistic missile program.
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CHAPTER IV
MITRE CORPORATION
The history of MITRE Corporation, which was organized in
1958, can only be understood and evaluated in light of the MIT-
Lincoln Laboratory role in developing an air defense system for
the North American continent and the AF experiment with R-W
as the systems engineer and technical director of the ballistic
missile program. It is for this latter reason that the Aerospace
story, which begins two years after MITRE, insofar as official
incorporation dates are concerned, has been covered first in this
presentation.
Early Air Defense Effort:
In December 1947, Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg, then Vice Chief
of Staff of the USAF, sent a memorandum to Dr. Vannevar Bush,
Chairman of the R&D Board, stated his concern over the lack of
an air defense system for the U.S. This expression of concern
led to an investigation of the problem by a committee of civilian
scientists, technical experts, and military personnel within the
R&D Board. The problems associated with the organizational
alignment of the R&D Board were discussed in Chapter 2. The
belief persisted that no world power in 1946 could seriously
menace the Continental U.S. through air attack, particularly
since we had sole possession of atomic weapons. The committee
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responded, after analysis of the problem, that the moderniza-
tion programs in being for the improvement of the air defense
posture were adequate for our forseeable national security needs.
The initial demonstration of nuclear capability on the part
of the USSR in 1949, jolted our national complacency with regard
to overall weapon superiority. The Russians had copied our B-29
and thus had a long-range striking force. With the bomb, plus
a suitable vehicle, all that was necessary was the intent of a
potential aggressor to use them against us. Gen. Vandenberg,
who by then had moved to the position of AF Chief of Staff,
shortly after the Soviet atomic explosion prepared a paper to
the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) calling attention to the desperate
need for a more effective air defense for the Continental U.S.
Concurrently, he requested the AF Scientific Advisory Board to
give their attention to the air defense problem. This led to
the establishment of a special study group under the chairman-
ship of Dr. George E. Valley of MIT, known as the Air Defense
Systems Engineering Committee (ADSEC).
The Vandenberg paper to the JCS resulted in a study by the
Weapon System Evaluation Group (WSEG) of the DOD. In the fall
of 1950 this group confirmed Gen. Vandenberg's fears concerning
inadequate defenses but provided no constructive answer to the
problem. The ADSEC Report published in October 1950, was
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harshly critical of the existing air defense system comparing
it to a "lame, purblind and idiot-like " animal. It asserted
that of these attributes the strongest trait was "idiotic" for
it made "little sense for us to strengthen the muscles if there
is no brain; and given a brain, it needs good eyesight". 1
Project Lincoln:
These harsh indictments coupled with his basic concern caused
Gen. Vandenberg in December 1950 to write to Dr. James R. Killian,
then President of MIT, asking that the university establish and
operate a large laboratory on contract to the AF dedicated to
the air defense problem. The pattern and precedent for this
approach had been established by the Office of Scientific R&D
during WW II.
In early 1951, the university conducted Project Charles an
intensive three month study of the air defense problem, under
the chairmanship of Dr. F. W. Loomis, on leave from the University
of Illinois. The Charles study confirmed the AF belief that the
Russian atomic bomb capability made air defense a problem of ex-
treme urgency and urged an immediate program to fill the need.
In July 1951, the MIT Corpbfation assented to this re-
quest made by Gen. Vandenberg. The result was the beginning of
a full scale laboratory effort designated Project Lincoln. In
May 1953, an article in the Air Force Magazine made this comment:
- I
"MIT's willingness to undertake this vast task was a
tribute to the Institute's management and its President,
Dr. James R. Killian, Jr., since assuming the responsibility
for Lincoln placed the Institute under a heavy strain. It
was taking on a project whose budget was twice that of MIT's
entire undergraduate teaching prolgram.n 2
MIT had a long and enviable record of service to the military
services in resolving technological problems. The university
position was that in a time of emergency universities have no
choice but to undertake R&D to assist the military in resolving
problems of national importance. This philosophy was undoubtedly
uppermost in their minds; however, the KT Q9PerAViPIJ may have
been influenced by another internal situation at the university.
In 1946 the Navy asked MIT to develop an airplane stabilizer
analyzer. The Servomechanisms Laboratory at MIT, which had been
assigned the project decided that the analog computers then
available would be inadequate for the job. They convinced the
Navy that an electronic digital computer that could perform
large and complex calculations at great speed was practical and
desirable. This decision led to the MIT development of Whirlwind
I.
The Servomechanisms Laboratory headed by Mr. Jay Forrester
had solved the basic design problems and subcontracted proto-
type production of Whirlwind I to Sylvania by 1948. The Office
of Naval Research was enthusiastic about Whirlwind's technical
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excellence and tried to convince other Navy activities of the
potential use of the computer to solve other problems besides
that of analyzing aircraft stability. The Laboratory develop-
ment costs began to exceed original estimates and since they
were unable to interest other groups in using the computer the
Navy began to question whether it could afford to support the
Whirlwind program. It began studies to determine whether the
aircraft stability analyzer program really needed a computer of
Whirlwind's capability and if a more reasonable approach might
be to cut off the MIT program and revert to use of a less ex-
pensive analog computer.
By 1949, the Navy advised MIT of the tight budgetary limi-
tations and asked the laboratory to furnish operational hard-
ware as soon as possible. They discouraged continued scientific
study of computer and electronic technology at their expense
and implied that they would be quite happy to see MIT pursue
its computer research effort but only if some other service
could be persuaded to foot the bill. The air defense require-
ments that would require a large scale digital computer like
Whirlwind, thus came at an opportune time for MIT and the Servo-
mechanisms Laboratory.
This comment on Whirlwind I is not to impugn the motives of
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the MIT Board in accepting the air defense problem. The AF
received the benefits of the research effort carried on and
supported at great cost by the Navy. The establishment of a
university laboratory at MIT to undertake this task offered
other advantages:
(1) Greater flexibility in management and operation than
possible in an AF operated laboratory.
(2) Scientific leadership and prestige of MIT, as well
as the excellent environment for scientific achievement, would
attract personnel that would not work in service laboratories
under civil service.
(3) A special laboratory established for a specific aim
gave a sense of urgency to an operational system rather than
mere technical investigation.
From the very start the MIT scientists recognized that an
ivory tower solution was not an acceptable answer to the air
defense problem. Fortune magazine quoted Dr. Valley, who was
instrumental in establishing the laboratory program:
"The worst thing that could happen would be for us to
spring a monster. We want to deliver something that works -
the prototype of a continental system that will be proved
out in its essential parts; and with which a cadre of
technicians will have already familiarized themselves
before the hardware has been produced." 3
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The contractual documents between the AF and MIT did not
assign the responsibilities for the design and development
of an operational air defense system to Lincoln Laboratories.
As indicated by Dr. Valley's comment they were responsible for
the prototype of a continental defense system, a complex
technological task.
"The air defense of the United States presents thA most
complicated problem this nation has faced. No problem
holds greater priority within our military system. The
answers are being sought through an effort comparable to
that which produced the first atomic bomb. Indeed this
effort is even broader in its scope.
"This air defense equivalent of the wartime Manhattan
District is known as Project LINCOLN, managed by the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology under an Air Force
contract." 4
Lincoln Laboratory Task:
It is important to note that in this program of highest
national priority the assignment of technical responsibility to
MIT was divorced by the AF from the systems responsibility for
the operational weapon system. This latter point became a
source of many controversies and irritation between the Lincoln
Laboratory and those AF agencies having vital interest in an
operational air defense system - ARDC, AMC and ADC. This
relationship stood out in marked contrast to the WDD which was
given the assignment and role responsibility to produce an
operational ballistic missile in the earliest possible time.
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The Lincoln Laboratory task was further complicated by the
fact that each of the military services had an interest and role
in the air defense task, even though the AF had been loosely
assigned overall responsibility. There was also a great
difference between different weapons advocates, even within
the same service, and between scientists as to the "best"
defense system measured in terms of bearable costs. How much
was it "worth" to go from a 50-60 percent to a 85-95 percent
kill rate, for example, became a battleground of contention
not only between military and scientists but between military
partisans within each of the services.
In 1952 a small group of scientists within Project Lincoln
were allowed to initiate the Summer Study Group to look into
certain fields, primarily electronic detection, which might per-
mit possible extension and speed up of the initial Project
Lincoln air defense plan. One of the recommendations of the
group, which became a political football among the military,
Congress, and scientists themselves, was a recommendation for
a multi-billion crash project to provide early warning stations
across the Artic. This system, the group considered, would
increase the kill ratio from 50-60 percent to 85-95 percent
and, more importantly, would permit four to six hour warning.
This time element would not only allow the SAC time to bomb-up
and initiate counterstrike action before the enemy force crossed
the U.S. frontier but would also permit civil defense action to
begin evacuation of our major cities.
The AF, with the support of other scientists, was skeptical.
It considered that the ultimate expense of establishing and
maintaining a DEW (distant early warning) line had been grossly
underestimated; Artic communications and logistics made reli-
ability questionable; and that after the first Artic warning,
no means existed for tracking the enemy strike force down through
Canada into the U.S. defense perimeter. The military position
was to make the close-in defense solid and then push the warning
and interception line farther out along the continental approaches
as technical advances justified the heavy investment. The AF
argued that an active air defense system alone did not provide
"security" and even if a near perfect air defense existed it
offered no hopes of a lasting peace. There was concern among
key AF leaders that if huge sums were spent for this defense
system, the money would be obtained by budgetary cutbacks and
crippling of strategic ..retaliatory strike force.
In its contractual relationships with MIT, as previously
indicated, the AF had not established clear cut understanding
as to their right to guide and monitor the Lincoln effort.
The school because of its power, prestige and access to highest
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AF channels preferred to deal directly with the Chief of Staff
or the Secretary of the AF-in matters of major policy signifi-
cance and was unwilling to accept supervision from the ARDC,
ADC, or AMC officers trying to direct the program. To some ex-
tent, the Lincoln unwillingness to deal with these offices re-
sulted from the political controversies and the continuous in-
fighting going on between these offices to gain a dominant
position in the air defense program. These difficulties may
have influenced the Quarles decision in 1954, discussed in the
previous chapter, which emphasized the need for WDD to delineate
ballistic missile systems responsibilities to either Convair
or R-W.
Insofar as Hq. USAF was concerned, Hq. ARDC was expected to
monitor and guide the Project Lincoln efforts. Hq. ARDC expected
its local agent in the Boston area, the Air Force Cambridge
Research Center (AFCRC) to assume management responsibilities
for the project. The Electronics Research Division of AFCRC
recognized that the assignment of such a role would put them in
the middle of a tug of war between the strong scientific skills
of MIT and the operational pull of the AF commands. The AFCRC
group argued successfully that it was basic research oriented
and this new role would sap its resources and weaken its cap-
ability to perform a vital research role.
IThe advent of the intercontinental ballistic missile era
posed a whole new set of problems. It not only renewed internal
AF dissensions concerning the division of budget allocations
between strategic offense but also revitalized old Army and AF
rivalries for dominance in the air defense role. By the time
the Lincoln Labs developed and proved their prototype air defense
system development in 1957 serious doubts were raised about the
system's capability to defend the nation against ICBM's. Several
Rand discussions were unofficially reported as early as 1955
which implied that the SAGE (semi-automatic ground environment)
system was obsolete before it was installed.
SAGE Implementation:
It must be remembered, however, that a considerable amount
of dollars and scientific resources had been spent to develop
the system. The SAGE system provided a major advance in air
defense capability against manned bomber attack. In the 1955-58
time period it was assumed that the amount of fissionable material
was fixed, and only a small number of bombs could be produced and
that the next war would be fought with a combination of bomber
aircraft and ballistic missiles. The AF vigorously supported
the need for making the SAGE system operational as soon as
possible. It considered that the integration of the Lincoln
prototype system into an operational SAGE system would require
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the services of a technically competent systems engineering
contractor. ARDC initially considered two sources:
(1) Lincoln Laboratory, the system developer, could assume
the role. However, the university, which recognized its respon-
sibilities to perform the R&D role, was loath to accept the
implementation role. The decision of MIT that it would be
improper for a university to act as technical supervisor to
industry was generally given as the reason for the eventual
creation of MITRE Corporation. While this may have played a
part in the decision making, ARDC made no concerted effort to
have MIT change its mind. Lincoln Labs had always displayed
what the military considered an unwarranted independence in
the SAGE development program. As previously indicated, MIT had
been reluctant to accept managerial guidance in technical matters
from the military. During the development phase ARDC unhappily
permitted this independence of action, but in the implementation
phase it could not tolerate such freedom in actions and decisions
affecting military operations.
(2) System Development Division of Rand Corporation, which
was established in December 1955 to undertake the adaptation,
installation and maintenance of the computer programs for each
SAGE Center, was also considered. The System Development Corpora-
tion (SDC), the nonprofit successor to the System Development
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Division was willing to accept the systems engineering role.
However, it was agreed that competences found at MIT as well
as SDC would have to be combined to supply the required technical
needs of the air defense program. Officials of both organizations
were unable to concur in the details of an acceptable integration
and "modus operandi"'. ARDC was unwilling to press the issue
because of the reluctance of the Commander ADC to permit SDC
to add air defense systems engineering to their workload for
fear that these added responsibilities would dilute and detract
from the company's ability to prepare the initial SAGE opera-
tional computer program.
In October 1957, the Commander ARDC invited thirteen major
electronics companies to participate in a meeting in Baltimore
to discuss this matter. The representatives agreed that the
technical competence required could be obtained through the
services of a prime industrial contractor, assisted by subor-
dinate contractors. However, only one contractor, RCA, indicated
a willingness to accept the assignment. Initially the other
contractors went along with recommending RCA for the prime
contractor role but then had uneasy second thoughts when they
considered the question of how much of the large production
contract RCA would be willing to subcontract. They also ex-
pressed concern with the release of proprietary information to
a prime with such hardware producing capabilities. Their initial
recommendation was converted to a divided position of (1) reten-
tion of MIT effort through Lincoln Labs, (2) use of Western
Electric Co., and (3) establishment of a new agency to be
formed from the technical resources of interested or partici-
pating industrial organizations.
After consideration of all of these recommendations, ARDC
recommended the selection of RCA. This recommendation was not
acceptable to the Secretary of the AF, who leaned toward giving
the task to Western Electric (WECO), the field engineering and
production arm of the American Telephone and Telegraph Corpora-
tion (AT&T). The Secretary considered WECO technically well
qualified and, as a regulated public utility, less susceptible
to charges of conflict of interest. This was the same kind of
reasoning that had been used by the AEC to entice AT&T to
establish a nonprofit subsidiary, the Sandia Corporation, to
operate the Los Alamos Corporation. However, while the Los
Alamos venture was in a field remote from their main interest,
the SAGE systems engineering job was in a area of prime concern
to AT&T. The company was deeply involved on many of the sub-
system contracts. They rejected the offer.
Creation of MITRE:
After almost a year of fruitless effort to find a solution
satisfactory to the three parties, the AF returned to MIT for
help. The university again concluded that a long term system
engineering task of this type was not appropriate for a uni-
versity laboratory. MIT proposed as an alternative solution
that they would sponsor the formation of a nonprofit corpora-
tion to take over the work, first under a subcontract and later
as a prime contractor. In July 1958, the MITRE Corporation was
founded, first as a nonprofit subcontractor to MIT and later
that year they superseded MIT as the prime contractor to the AF.
The Corporation mission, as quoted in the Certificate of
Incorporation, read almost exactly like the Aerospace mission
previously quoted:
"The objects and purposes of the corporation are exclusively
scientific, as herein set forth: to engage in, assist and
contribute to the support of scientific projects for, -and to
perform, engage in, and procure research, development,
engineering and advisory services to or for the U.S. Govern-
ment, or any department or agency thereof." 5
When translated into specifics, this broad and generalized
charge meant that MITRE would undertake the systems engineering
and technical direction of the SAGE air defense system for the
Air Defense System Integration Division (ADSID) of ARDC. In
1958, ADSID had been established at L. G. Hanscom Air Base
near Bedford, Massachusetts to act as the central military
organization for air defense in the same capacity as WDD for
the ballistic missile. In like manner, the AF assigned a General
officer, Major General Kenneth Bergquist to provide the leadership
and strength deemed necessary to weld the ARDC, AMC and ADC
interests into a unified whole.
SAGE was the first large computer-based command and control
system. The heart of the system was a computer, the electronic
brain that planned the interception. The computer assimilated
data coming from dispersed radar sites and figured out instantly
the direction and speed at which a given interceptor could
get within striking range of the invader. It then displayed
these data to the ADC Commander who selected the offensive
weapon, BOMARC missile, anti-aircraft fire, or aircraft fighter-
interceptor to be used and the tactics to be employed for inter-
ception. The original AF air defense system was based on an
area defense concept and called for the installation of SAGE
computers at 42 air defense direction centers.
From the very start, MITRE recognized the job as twofold.
First, it called for the construction of large physical
facilities to house the system and the installation of extensive
hardware. This job was assigned to the WECO which provided
systems installation and integration to the AF. While MITRE
provided broad general system specifications and test parameters
the conversion of this data to installation specifications and
test plans was left with Western Electric, which because of its
experience was best able to provide these services. The second
and more important part of the job was systems integration of
the various air defense subsystems and associated software, or
computer programming.
SAGE Integration:
The key to the success of the air defense system was
integration and the ADSID role was to provide this integration.
All segments of the air defense system, the Army anti-aircraft
sites and their Missile-Master control, BOMARC missiles, Navy
picket ships, fighter as well as strategic air components had to
be integrated within the system. MITRE occupied a line position
to the Commander ADSID and was directly responsible for the
systems engineering, technical direction and technical integra-
tion.
Integration was complex not only because of the many activities
and functions involved but also because the introduction of the
computer modified the traditional boundaries of responsibility
of the AF commands. ADC found that their control of the computer
program was essential if they were to control the operational
characteristics of the system. This meant putting ADC in the
equipment specification business to a degree never before
encountered in previous weapon systems.
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ARDC found that it was not enough to engineer the components.
System component testing could not be accomplished without getting
deep into the computer program, which put it closer to the opera-
tions business. As a result the testing phase became one of
the major cost elements of the entire system. But unlike a
ballistic missile, the development process was never finished
because modifications and improvements were always necessary.
Thus, ARDC found itself in the act long after the system became
operational because expansion and modification of the system
resulting from operational experience and changing technology
never stopped.
AMC found that the computer added new complexities to the
procurement and production of all components. It found that
the traditional depot maintenance procedures no longer applied
and normal lines that separated ARDC and AMC areas of respon-
sibility were fuzzy. The three commands found it difficult to
stay out of each other backyards. Although the intent of ADSOD
was to : bin" WDD characteristics by consolidating and collo-
cating staffs, the activity was neither given the budgetary
freedom nor the management autonomy granted Gen. Schriever.
For the first year of its existence, MITRE had a single
large system engineering job, SAGE. Less than a year later,
reconsideration of the defense problem in the missile era by
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the DOD led to a deemphasis of manned bomber defense and a
decision not to proceed with any major system improvement except
those already in the pipeline. The growing MITRE effort on air
defense began to diminish. It is interesting to note that the
WECO efforts in the SAGE program flourished because installa-
tion continued even with deemphasis of priority. However, the
installation program was reduced from 42 to 34 direction centers.
Command and Control:
The nuclear era caused the SAGE effort to diminish but
emphasized the need for automated military command and control
systems. The paramount importance of communication between the
commander and the weapon wielders had long been recognized.
Prior to SAGE, the components of the air defense system were
linked together by human beings. SAGE eliminated many of the
human links in the system and showed the key role that automatic
data processing systems might play in obtaining, transmitting
and rapidly displaying intelligence with the required reliability
and in a format that permitted quicker decision making.
The atomic missile reduced the decision making process to
minutes and allowed fewer and fewer alternatives to completely
automated warfare. By the time the commander was briefed in the
traditional method, deliberated, and reached a decision, the need
for this decision might well be past. Thus the importance
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of the data handling system approached the importance of the
weapon system for which the data was being handled. MITRE became
deeply interested in the development of command and control
systems.
Their study of the problem soon led them to expound con-
cepts that were considered heretical to the official military
party line. MITRE and the Commander ADSID recognized at an
early date that "command and control" could not be separated
into distinct and separate systems for each commander, could not
even be considered in the framework of just a total AF system,
but must be considered in the context of a national military
system. In 1959, the ADSID-MITRE group were expounding con-
cepts that were not accepted until three years later when the
DOD established the National Military Command System.
SAGE demonstrated to the AF commander that it might be
possible to obtain a system showing them what was happening
anywhere in the world, what he had available to commit to
combat and the ability to implement his commands whenever and
wherever action was required depending upon battle conditions.
The major air commands jumped on the bandwagon to get their
own command and control systems. Very little study effort went
into the decision. Each command considered its own problem
without regard to the integration problem that had proved the
-93-
biggest difficulty in SAGE. MITRE personnel considered that this
proliferation of conmiand and control systems was wasteful. They
considered that what was needed was not speedy development but
study effort to determine on a national basis what was needed
in the way of command and control systems and how these systems
should fit together.
ADSID-MITRE Role:
This position was not shared by Hq ARDC who looked upon
ADSID-MITRE concepts as "egghead", what one could expect from
a group reared in an academic environment. ARDC fai].ed to
recognize the peculiarities of command and control systems.
They took the point of view that a system, electronic or other-
wise, was a distinct entity, only incidentally related to other
systems, and as a thing to be developed, manufactured, installed
and put to use as quickly as possible. It was under pressure from
the major commands to get operational systems in being and it
was determined to produce as quickly as possible without ques-
tioning the soundness of concepts behind the system. MITRE
scientists considered that the mere technical integration of
these systems made little sense unless accompanied and preferable
preceeded by "functional integration", a thorough rethinking of
the operational and organizational requirements of electronic
warfare.
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It must be remembered, however, that MITRE was a line element
to the Commander ADSID. As a separate private corporation on
contract to the AF they could advise the ADSID Commander to
oppose other major commanders but this would take place through
normal military channels. Their open and vigorous criticism of
the approach that was being taken in command and control could
only have occurred with the full support of General Bergquist,
Commander ADSID. The reason that the General felt so strongly
about this issue that he was willing to antagonize his military
peers and superiors may have stemmed from an event he had
personally witnessed and experienced at Hq ADC in 1952.
The account of that day, April 17, 1952, is recorded in Arnold
Brophy's book, The Air Force, and recounted in Herman Kahn's
book, On Thermonuclear War.6
On that day four vapor trails were sighted over Nunviak
Island and reported through the existing Air Defense System.
The intelligence officer at Hq ADC, Captain Wood, considered
this sighting of possible extreme importance because of intelli-
gence material he had on hand. This information was reported
through the ADC Deputy for Intelligence to Gen. Bergquist, then
Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations. Brophy's account indicates
the concern and effort made to ascertain the reliability of the
information that had been passed on by an Eskimo. His description
continues:
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"The General did not waste anytime in getting to the Command
Post. Again, everything was checked and the officers attempted
to clarify the Nunivak sighting by contacting Elmendorf through
the Western Defense Force. At this point the message came
into Colorado Springs: 'Nothing here:'
"And then all the lines to Alaska went dead.
"By now the tempo of activity had been shoved into high gear.
Telephone lines were loaded with calls back and forth with
the three defense forces. Conferences were held over
classified circuits".
The general officer on duty at the USAF Command Post in the
Pentagon, Washington, D. C. was informed of the situation. Gen.
Bergquist advised Gen. Smith, Vice Commander of ADC, who rushed
down to the ADC Command Post. Brophy continues:
"It was 3:10 a.m. when Wood walked over to the tsenior
officers. Eastern had just called in and reported five
unknown coming in over Presque Isle. Presque Isle is in
Maine.
"Smith looked up quickly. This triggered it. 'The Air
Defense Command goes on full Air Defense Readiness immediately',
he said.
"The time was 3:11 a.m., April 17, 1952. Air Force Head-
quarters in Washington was notified. The Joint Chiefs of
staff alerted. President Truman was awakened.
The incident vividly and forcibly brought to Gen. Bergquist's
attention that such decisions were really issues of war or peace
and required centralized and responsible decision making -
decision making that was beyond that residing in the field
commanders, service heads, or any military representative, but
at the level of the President or his designated representative.
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The issue of ADSID role was put in the hands of Gen. Schriever,
who had been promoted from Commander, BMD, to Commander, ARDC.
From the previous description of Aerospace history there was
no question that "implementation", earliest delivery of an
operational weapon, was the common goal of both the military and
R-W in ballistic missile programs. Gen. Schriever considered
that advanced conceptual planning was done by the Air Staff at
the Hq USAF and passed on as authoritative guidance to ARDC.
MITRE and other technical experts were to accept this authori-
tative guidance and examine and evaluate the different command
and control systems in the light of the authorized concepts.
When feasibility and systems engineering were completed by
MITRE, then the WDD philosophy of concurrency would apply, rapidly
translating electronic technology into useful and approved com-
mand and control systems.
C2D2 Concept:
As previously indicated in the discussion of Aerospace
Corporation, the tendency was to jump on the Schriever "band-
wagon of success". The ARDC staff wanted to duplicate the
ballistic missile experience with command and control systems.
It considered that the best way to accomplish this was to abolish
ADSID and establish the AF Command Control Development Division
(AFC2D2 ) to manage the development and implementation of command
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and control systems.
Gen. Bergquist attempted to convince Gen. Schriever that
command and control system development was vastly different
from ballistic missile development. Missiles were revolutionary.
The development and operation of a new missile was divorced
from the operation of systems in place. One did not have the
interlace and integration of the various pieces that was
necessary in a command and control system. The latter was evo-
lutionary, and new systems were built upon the old structure,
improving rather than creating a new weapon. Gen. Bergquist
stressed that the major effort should be advanced conceptual
planning and he argued that this was vastly different from
planning the concurrent development of a system or group of
systems. He argued that the planning that was required must
start first with a new and open look at the aims of national
military policy; than a review of the state of the art; and
finally, formulation of broad recommendations for system para-
meters. At that stage and not before, could you plan, design
and develop the many "L" systems that the AF operational com-
manders were seeking.
Gen. Bergquist persisted in the belief that the role he
and MITRE considered necessary could not be achieved within the
framework of C2D2 . Rather than surrender to the ARDC desires
he preferred that ADSID and MITRE remain independent and be
assigned directly to the Air Staff or the DOD; or if this were
not acceptable, be integrated within ADC.
Gen. Schriever and his staff were not convinced by the
arguments. They recognized too that an independent ADSID
organization would be a threat to their assigned responsibilities.
They considered that the ADSID mission must be assumed within
the proposed C2D2 and MITRE must join the organization in a
technical line-staff relationship just as R-W functioned for
the ballistic missile program. In November 1959, C2D2 was
established by Hq ARDC and Gen. Bergquist was named as the
first Commander. ADSID was abolished and MITRE became the
technical arm of the new division.
Strictly speaking C2D2 neither developed command control
systems nor evaluated the need and requirements of the system.
It was primarily a planning and managing organization that ex-
pedited the development and tried to integrate each system
technically and functionally with other related systems. MITRE
was given responsibilities for twelve of the fourteen separate
command and control systems known as "L"I systems. Their respon-
sibilities ranged from technical consultation to complete system
design.
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Growth of MITRE:
In this atmosphere, MITRE flourished insofar as physical
growth was concerned. On January 1, 1959 the Corporation had
a technical staff of 205 scientists and engineers; by September 1,
1962 the number had more than tripled to 661 technical personnel.
CHART 8
MITRE PERSONNEL GROWTH
Calendar
Year*
1959
1960
1961
1962
(6 mos)
Fiscal
Year**
1963
1964
1965
Average Tech-
nical Staff
262
371
478
588
592
495
481
Support
Personnel
589
879
993
1121
1414
1348
1260
*Source: Holifield Hearings, 1962
**Source: Hq AFSC
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Total
(Average)
851
1250
1471
1709
2006
1843
1741
The peak in personnel strength was reached in fiscal year
1964 when the total manpower approached 2100 people; however,
budget reductions soon thereafter caused personnel cutbacks and
the average total employment for that year was slightly less than
fiscal year 1963. On the other hand, total dollar revenues to
support the MITRE effort continued to increase.
CHART 9
MITRE TOTAL REVENUES
58 - 31 Mar 59
59 - 31 Mar 60
60 - 31 Mar 61
61 - 31 Mar 62
62 - 31 Mar 63
63 - 31 Mar 64
Total Revenue
2,343,784
19,351,617
25,420,577
31,053,090
36,661,930
38,242,186
Source: Holifield Hearings 1962
MITRE Annual Report 1962, 1963, 1964
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Period
21 Jul
1 Apr
1 Apr
1 Apr
1 Apr
1 Apr
--I
The annual increase in total revenue, even with recent
reductions in manpower, was attributed to annual cost of living
increases and the fact that the educational level of the personnel
employed at MITRE had increased. To help sustain their technical
competence, MITRE encouraged and supported advanced employee
education. In 1963-64 there were candidates for 88 Masters
degrees and 30 Doctorate's in their various educational assist-
ance programs.
CHART 10
MITRE TECHNICAL EDUCATION LEVEL
Degree
B.S.
M.S.
Ph.D.
No degree
Total
1962
Number Percent
317 48
263 39.8
56 8.5
25 3.7
661 100.0
1963
Number Percent
327 44.1
318 42.9
69 9.3
27 3.7
741 100.0
1964
Number Percent
292 40.5
326 45.2
77 10.7
26 3.6
721 100.0
Source: MITRE Annual Reports 1962, 1963, 1964
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CHART 11
MITRE DISCIPLINES (1964)
Disciplines Number Percent
Electrical Engineering 287 39.8
Other Engineering 55 7.7
Mathematics 136 18.9
Physics 70 9.8
Psychology 35 4.8
Other Fields 112 15.5
No Degree 26 3.5
Total 721 100.0
Source: MITRE Annual Report 1964
National Military Command System:
In 1958-59, as previously indicated, MITRE recognized that
"command and control" could not be a conglomeration of individual
systems for the many commanders within the military services.
They recognized that "command and control" must be considered
in the context of a national military system. The validity of
these ideas were not recognized at the time. Air Force com-
manders wanted the advantages of computer technology, C2D2
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encouraged and supported the proliferation of separate command
and control systems, and MITRE's revenues increased and their
personnel strength grew. In 1962, the DOD reached the conclu-
sion that a national military command system was required - a
need recognized by MITRE in 1958.
The DOD began the development of a completely integrated
command system at the highest level that would be survivable
and assure continuity of military operations at all times. A
technical support office was established at DOD level.
Mr. Esterly Page, founder and former President of Page Communi-
cations Inc., was selected as Director of National Military
Command Systems (NMCS) Technical Support, an office assigned
to the Director of Defense Research and Engineering. The
Defense Communications Agency (DCA) was assigned responsibility
for the necessary engineering and system integration functions.
Major General Bestic was transferred from Hq USAF to DCA to
become Deputy Director, NMCS. The centralization of decision
making and management control at DOD level was felt in the AF
command and control program.
DOD Policy:
On October 26, 1963 the Secretary of Defense issued a policy
paper subject: "Development, Acquisition, and Operation of the
Command and Control Systems of the Unified and Specified Commands"
-- -- Iiillillkvllll
which assigned to the unified and specified commanders these
responsibilities for the development, acquisition and operation
of i command and control (C&C) system:
"(1) Establish and submit to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
Secretary of Defense for approval the operational requirements,
and any modification thereto, for his C&C system;
"1(2) Participate in the formulation of system design and
system performance and design specifications for his C&C
system;
"(3) Participate in the formulation of engineering, manage-
ment, procurement, facility, construction, and installation's
plans developed to satisfy his C&C requirements;
"(4 ) Review system design; system performance and design
specifications; and the principal engineering, management,
procurement, facility, construction, and installation
plans and schedules proposed by the military department
supporting his command before initial contracts are nego-
tiated or before amendments are negotiated to outstanding
contracts; and submit his views thereon to the Secretary
of the supporting military department before the Secretary
of the military department concerned takes final action or
submits recommendations to the Secretary of Defense;" 7
This directive spelled out clearly that decision making in
command and control that had previously been made at Air Staff
level would now be done at DOD level. Secondly, it assigned
system responsibilities to the unified and specified commanders
that had previously been held by AFSC and its command and control
division, ESD. As a Hq USAF letter stated, "the referenced DOD
memorandum requires a reapprai.sal of management relationships and
responsibilities." 8
As of this date, ESD and Hq AFSC have been unable to develop
a management relationship that the Air Staff will approve. The
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large scale command and control systems such as 465L (Strategic
Air Command and Control System) or 425L (NORAD .ombat Operations
Center) - systems large enough to require a SETD organization
were considered to the things of the past. The AF guidance to
major commanders emphasized that "improvements in command and
control capabilities will normally be accomplished incrementally
and in an evolutionary manner." 9 The result has been that in
the past two years MITRE and ESD have not been authorized to
start a new command and control system.
This fact stood out clearly in a series of advertisements
run by MITRE Corporation in trade publications in 1964. These
ads stressed the challenge of the work effort going on at MITRE.
The projects mentioned were SAGE (semi automatic ground environ-
ment), BUIC (backup interceptor control for the SAGE system),
NORAD Combat Operations Center, BMEWS (ballistic missile early
warning system, NUDETS (nuclear detonation detection and
reporting system) and NMCS. All of these systems except NMCS
were many years old and the development as well as the major
technical integration work had been completed. In the case of
NMCS, as previously indicated, the prime engineering responsi-
bility for this system had been assigned to DCA.
MITRE provided assistance to DCA in the development of the
NMCS; it was also involved in various enroute air traffic
control projects for FAA. In these efforts, however, they pro-
vided well qualified scientists and engineers to assist these
organizations. FAA and DCA had their own engineering staffs
and there was no effort made by these activities to integrate
MITRE into their organizations in a line and staff relationship,
the kind of relationship deemed necessary by the AF for SETD
nonprofits.
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CHAPTER V
PRESENT VIEWS OF SETD NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS
Historical factors were given a prominent role in the pre-
vious chapters in reconstructing the forces that resulted in
the establishment of the particular organizational entity in
defense R&D labeled the SETD nonprofit. The historical analysis
indicated that initially, the AF recognized a need for industrial
and scientific blessing and acceptance of their nonprofit crea-
tion; however, this acceptance underwent alteration with time
and a changing environment.
The criticism of SETD nonprofits from government, industrial
and academic circles continued to grow in the 1960's, as pre-
viously indicated. In order to get an up-to-date picture of
how the different parties most directly involved with the SETD
nonprofits viewed the situation and issues today, a series of
interviews were held with personnel in DOD, the AF, industry,
universities and the nonprofit corporations.
These interviews form,'. the basis of this chapter, in
which MITRE and Aerospace Corporations are viewed through
four pairs of eyes: (1) AF, (2) DOD, (3) industry, and (4) the
nonprofits themselves. Much of the data collected was subjective
rather than objective; however, it represented the opinions of
people and industrial corporations that have a large stake in
defense R&D from either a public or private standpoint. As
such, it must be recognized and evaluated.
Air Force View of MITRE and Aerospace Corporations:
Within the AF one found numerous opinions concerning the use,
value and future of MITRE and Aerospace Corporations. In this
regard, the broad spectrum of opinion regarding these activities
was no different from that noted outside of the AF. Since sys-
tem engineering non-profits were identified with the AF, there
were official policies supporting their existence and use.
Opposition within the AF family was covert rather than overt.
One found strong anti-nonprofit sentiment expressed verbally;
however, official papers in opposition to MITRE and Aerospace
were non-existent.
The position noted in this section was based upon policy
statements of the Secretary of the AF, position papers used by
Gen. Schriever at Congressional hearings, and written documents
obtained from AFSC activities. The official AF position has
undergone little change since 1954.
In his testimony before the House Committee on Appropriations
in 1963, Gen. Schriever argued that the basic criteria and prin-
ciples that led to the determination to use R-W as the systems
engineer and technical director of the ballistic missile program
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in 1954 applied to other major fields of military technology
which had now become critical to the AF's mission. These condi-
tions were: (1) technical complexity, (2) requirement for a
broad industrial base, (3) strong university support, and
(4) integration of the industrial and scientific base with the
military retaining overall control. Therefore, SETD nonprofits
were required not only for ballistic missiles but also for space
and command and control programs. The AF supported SETD for
aeronautical systems with in-house resources.
Difficulties With In-House Personnel Resources:
The question repeatedly asked was, Why haven't in-house
resources assumed SETD responsibilities for all AF programs?
The significant increase in scientific in-house capability
assigned to support the AFSC mission may be noted in these
charts:
CHART 12
ARDC/AFSC SCIENTIFIC AND ENGINEERING PERSONNEL GROWTH
Military Civilian Total
1951 (30 Sep) 1800 3097 4897
1964 (30 Jun) 4866 5176 10042
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CHART 13
AFSC ACADEMIC LEVELS OF SCIENTIFIC AND ENGINEERING PERSONNEL
(As of 30 Jun 1964)
Ph. (1) Masters Bachelors No Degree
Military 2% (95) 38% (1845) 57% (2751) 3% (175)
Civilian 3% (146) 14% (710) 70% (3614) 13% (706)
Total 2% (241) 25% (2555) 64% (6365) 9% (881)
Source: Hq AFSC
These impressive statistics, unfortunately, concealed skill
and retention problems. These problems were:
(1) Technical obsolescense of many middle management people.
The initial manning of the Command in 1951 came from the Engineer-
ing Division of the former AMC. Although personnel requirements
were high then, their experience levels dated from WW II. Many
of these men were "obsolescent engineers" and were unable to
provide the systems engineering skills and capabilities required
to support the technical complexities of new systems. This
military problem was no different from that experienced by
industry in areas of rapidly changing technology.
(2) Maldistribution of AFSC R&D personnel. The distribu-
tion of R&D personnel assets -is noted in Chart 14.
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ICHART 14
R&D PERSONNEL BY LENGTH OF SERVICE
4 year obligees
4 - 13 years service
Korea (17 - 19 years service)
WW II (22+ years service)
29%
40%
17%
14%
Source: Hq AFSC
(a) The retention of new technical officers was
extremely low and has not exceeded 20%. These men, who came
from Officer Training School and the AF ROTC Program had un-
impressive school records as noted in Chart 16, which although
based on FY 63 records w,as considered valid for FY 64 and FY 65.
CHART 15
FY-63
R&D PERSONNEL ACQUISITION AND TRAINING
Officer Tng
School AF ROTC
Total Acquired 5248
No. With Engineering
Degree of any Kind 341 (6%)
No. With C+ or
Better Average 87 (2%)
*(Only 19 were electronic engineers, a
Source: Hq AFSC
3392
728 (23%
Total
8650
1128 (13%)
256(7%) 343 (4%)
critical speciality)
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(b) Seventy-two percent of all R&D officers in the
7 - 14 group were on flying status and subject to a priority
levy by Hq USAF for qualified pilots to fill cockpit jobs in
flying commands. Efforts were made to defer R&D officers from
this levy; however, the critical needs of the AF resulted in
losses of good technical people from the Command.
(c) In the next six years voluntary and mandatory re-
tirements will result in the loss of large numbers of the most
experienced R&D officers with WW II and Korean war experiences
as noted in Chart 16.
CHART 16
RETIREMENT PICTURE FY 65-70
FY 66 Eligibility FY 70
For Voluntary Mandatory
Retirement Retirement
R&D Colonels 98% 70%
R&D Lt. Colonels 88% 54%
Source: Hq AFSC
The Command exerted tremendous efforts to upgrade its in-
house technical and managerial capabilities through education
and training. Officer and civilian education was encouraged.
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In fiscal year 1964, for example, AFSC officers completed
9,864 courses at colleges and universities, and civilians
were enrolled in 5,886 courses at graduate study centers,
executive development programs, or military and civilian
institutions for specialized instruction.
In the case of civilian in-house resources, the higher
Civil Service pay scales adopted in fiscal years 64 and 65
reduced turnover of personnel; however, continued DOD emphasis
on reducing the level of government manpower made future approval
of increased civilian authorizations extremely unlikely. In
fact, civilian manpower authorizations in the AF were projected
to decrease in future years.
Although the scientific and technical manpower of the
Command more than doubled since 1951, the AFSC R&D mission
increased even more. If measured in dollar magnitude, it grew
more than 250% from 1954 to the present, even after adjustment
downward to discount inflation of the dollar. A more meaningful
yardstick might be to compare total technical effort required
for an aircraft weapon system of ten years ago compared with a
ballistic missile system. The B-47, B-52, and B-58 required
from 3 to 9 million manhours while the Atlas "D" required 31
million manhours of total scientific and engineering manhours
from design to first test or configuration "freeze".
Nonprofits vs. Industry for SETD Role:
The AF considered that the technical obsolescence of many of
their middle management people; the failure of the AF to attract
and retain young technical officers; and the attrition of ex-
perienced technical managers through retirement precluded the
attainment of an in-house capability to accomplish SETD of a
growing R&D program. In their justification for nonprofits
rather than industry for the SETD job, the AF based their
decision on these factors: (1) objectivity; (2) unique com-
petence; (3) access to privileged information, and (4) flexi-
bility.
Objectivity:
Even today, the AF claimed, few, if any contractors, regard-
less of size and competence were capable of producing a complex
system without using subcontractors to accomplish portions of
the effort. The determination by the prime as to which portions
to subcontract became a difficult decision insofar as the over-
all interests of the government and the prime contractor were
concerned. The prime may desire to perform a job in-house in
order to build or augment his facilities and competence, ignoring
either a qualified producer or the fact that a satisfactory
product may already be in existence. From a government standpoint
such action might be detrimental to the overall national interest.
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Conflict could also arise in the resolution of technical inter-
face problems during the integration of subsystems. The SETD
activity was required to oversee the subsystem contractors, at
times was forced to compromise one set of subsystem specifica-
tions to improve optimum system performance. The role was
critical and subject to extreme political pressures. The
problem that faced the AF in selecting the SETD agent was
indicated by Max Golden:
"We could not risk a systems contractor who might be
personally affected by the outcome of his decisions.
He must have no axe to grind, no subsystem of his own to
favor or defend, when he sought to reiolve conflicts and
and bring subsystems into balance."
If a company producing hardware had to make such a decision
they would be put in a position of both litigant and judge.
When a company had to make a choice when its own product was
involved, the AF stated that bias was difficult to eliminate.
On the other hand, nonprofits could be objective in resolving
technical interface problems because (1) they were not profit
motivated; (2) salesmanship was not involved since they Uc lot
compete for work; (3) they produced no hardware, and (4) they
had no production design responsibilities which might influence
test plans.
The full interchange of knowledge was accepted and demanded
by university scientists; however, important industrial scientific
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discoveries were, at times, considered company secrets and were
not disseminated. The knowledge of this fundamental industrial
development work was necessary not only to determine the state-
of-the-art but also to evaluate production feasibility. The AF
claimed that nonprofit characteristics of "no profit" and "no
hardware production", encouraged closer cooperation and inter-
change of information between nonprofit and industrial scientists
than could be achieved with an industrial contractor.
Unique Competence:
MITRE and Aerospace Corporations had a special and continuing
relationship with the AF. They were considered part of a speci-
fic military organization having a broad but defined area of
work in either ballistic missiles, space, or command and control.
As a result, they developed and sustained a high level of competence
in the many technological fields and interfaces associated with
these specific areas.
This concentration of effort within a single broad area of
interest permitted the integration of scientists and engineers
with varied skills to solve complex systems problems. Their
family relationship with the AF made them cognizant of military
requirements and needs gained through their close working rela-
tionship, according to the AF, enabled the nonprofits to act
as a bridge between the military and the academic and industrial
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scientific community to bring the best of the changing technology
to weapon system development.
Since it dealt with only one prime client, the nonprofit
corporation organized with the sole objective of providing the
best possible support to that customer. Recruitment and train-
ing of people, organizational structure and job allocations
were carried out to the specific tasks of the customer.
System development and implementation generally exceeded
the three to four year tour of assignment of a military officer
to a system program office. Continuity of effort by nonprofit
personnel on a single system from conceptual and advanced
planning stages through initial system engineering provided a
stability of effort of inestimable value. The continuity of
effort over a period of years for new but associated systems
provided a background of experience on diverse projects which
enabled the nonprofit corporation to draw together quickly
necessary teams of people with the proper background to under-
take the new project. This unique capability resulted from the
special position of the nonprofit, and AF managers stated it
could not be obtained from industry.
Access to Information:
There were inhibitions to using an industrial contractor for
the important tasks of advanced system research, analysis and
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planning, and research and experimentation. Full participation
in these tasks required access to military plans and data of
great military and commercial sensitivity. In the command
and control area, for example, it was, essential that the engineer
have access to war plans and decision making apparatus of the
operational commands so that effective man-machine relationships
could be designed in the system. Selection of a competitive,
profit seeking corporation on a continual basis for these
functions would give this contractor an unfair advantage over
competition in later procurement. The recommendation that this
job be rotated among competing companies, or, if this was not
feasible, to assure that each competitor was given access to
the same or equivalent information was considered impractical.
The AF was also responsible for the technical evaluation of
contractor proposals, either unsolicited or in response to
military procurement invitations. Private industry, the AF
stated, could neither be allowed access to this information nor
be permitted to assist in the development of the technical
criteria used by the government in decision making. The technical
competence required to evaluate these proposals was not always
available in in-house resources; therefore, the AF used the
nonprofits in their staff capacity to advise them technically.
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The decision making role was restricted to the military, the AF
claimed, and was not delegated to nonprofit personnel.
Certain programs dealt with information of such sensitivity
that it was considered inadvisable to permit a few or even one
contractor full access to such data. In such a condition, the
"need-to-know" was so restrictive that technical design and in-
tegration was performed by a few government, or, if necessary,
nonprofit employees. The Manhattan project was handled in this
fashion and, in recent years the development of certain intelli-
gence systems required such restrictive security measures.
Flexibility:
The physical collocation of nonprofit with ESD, BSD and SSD
personnel, and the contractual arrangements between the corpora-
tions and the AF, permitted quick response and flexibility in
the assignment of personnel to immediate military demands.
When situations demanded technical assistance without delay,
resort to normal contracting procedures involved unacceptable
delays. The AF also considered that the introduction of new
organizations to such problems, where an accumulated data source
was already available in the nonprofits, was costly and time
consuming.
Flexibility was also achieved through organizational and
personnel alignment of nonprofits with the military structure
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they supported. MITRE and Aerospace established project-
oriented managerial units that more or less paralleled the
military management structure. For all practical purposes the
nonprofit people were considered part of the "Air Force ramily",
and allowed unusual military-contractor relationships that the
AF considered was not attainable with an industrial contractor.
In a period of defense economy and cost effectiveness, the
AF emphasized the importance of the plant, special facilities
and technical laboratories that existed at Aerospace and MITRE
Corporations. The AF had paid for these facilities and con-
sidered that the nation could neither afford to let these
facilities go to waste nor allow-the facilities to be duplicated
by industry for the sake of competition.
Basis of Air Force Relationship:
The AF justification and guidelines for use of Aerospace
and MITRE were subject to criticism from industry, Congressional
committees, and various representatives of the DOD. In September
1961, Secretary of the AF Eugene Zuckert issued policy guidance,
intended to provide a basis for AF relations with five nonprofit
corporations - Aerospace, Analytical Services, MITRE, RAND, and
System Development Corporation. He considered that the special
status of these corporations, in their "close and continuing
relationship" with the AF, set them apart from other organizations
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either profit or nonprofit, and made special rules of procedures,
conduct and control necessary. His guidance letter to Gen.
Lemay stated:
"We look to these nonprofit corporations to focus the
nation's finest scientific and technical talents on
selected and highly sophisticated tasks. They must
not become convenient catchalls for projects which could
be performed by private industry; the elite nature of
their technical staffs must be preserved. Any dilution of
the select quality of these organizations can only have an
adverse effect on their ability to carry out their vital
Air Force work. Procedures must be developed to require
them to coordinate with the Air Force before undertaking
assignments from other Government agencies or commercial
sources." 2
Government control and supervision of these nonprofit
corporations was considered necessary to prevent abuse of their
special status. He urged that:
(1) Business aspects of their affairs be open and subject to
AF review and claimed that "such accountability is not incon-
sistent with freedom of thought and independence on technical
matters."
(2) There must be no conflict of interest between employees
and trustees of these corporations and the public interest.
(3) Corporations must be objective in their evaluation and
dealings with industry and exercise discretion in their handling
of contractor proprietary information.
(4) Fees be tailored to their special status and should
permit stability of effort.
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(5) Government should make every effort to provide the
physical facilities required by the corporations, but, if
necessary, physical facilities, could be acquired and paid for
through fee arrangements. Upon dissolution of the corporations,
the disposition of these physical facilities should be determined
by the Secretary of the AF.
(6) Salary levels must be such as to attract and retain the
highest order of talent but should not exceed the market rate
for such individuals. The overall salary structure of the
corporations must be subject to AF review.
AFSC P6licy Letter of April 1963:
Congressional criticism continued and opponents stressed
the proliferation of nonprofit corporations and foundations
and the "spiraling budgets" of AF nonprofit contractors. In
April 1963, Gen. Schriever supplemented Mr. Zuckert's instruc-
tions with a policy letter which contained these key points as
regards MITRE and Aerospace: 3
(1) Programs assigned to ESD, BSD, or SSD will not auto-
matically be assigned to nonprofits.
(2) Nonprofits must remain relatively small in order to
retain elite nature of their support.
(3) lati:itof], suppbrtcto-tedhnical staffs must be controlled.
(4) Nonprofits must not become involved in hardware
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production for either prototype or service use.
(5) Nonprofit must not be used to circumvent manpower
ceilings or curb service laws.
(6) Nonprofits must not be used to perform nontechnical
or administrative services.
The reason for the continued use of MITRE and Aerospace
Corp. by the AF, under the growing barrage of criticism in
Congress, industry, and the DOD was summarized by this comment
made by Gen. Schriever before the House Appropriations Committee
in both the 1962 and 1963 hearings: "I would not know what I
would do if I did not have this capability. I just could not
get the job done." 4 He emphasized, however, that the manage-
ment system he pioneered and institutionalized was not a
dereliction of his responsibilities but resulted in tighter AF
management control of weapon technology development. He contended
that the AF approach met the Bell Committee qualifications of
"getting the job done effectively and efficiently with due regard
to the long-term strength of the Nation's scientific and technical
resources; and avoiding assignment of work which would create
inherent conflicts of interest." 5
Department of Defense View of MITRE and Aerospace Corporations:
The DOD had no single official position on the use and
future role of SETD nonprofit corporations. Within the DOD
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conflicting opinions and strong feelings about the continued use
of nonprofits were expressed. These opinions were stirred and
restirred by Congressional and industrial pressures to do some-
thing about the "growth of these activities". Decision making
in this area was made as a reaction to pressures rather than as
a result of a systematic study of the "legitimate" requirements
of the AF and, therefore, the DOD.
The result was that the present DOD policy was to impose
rigid fiscal control over all nonprofits and stop further
growth. In the interim, DOD and other governmental activities
continued to investigate, review, and evaluate the nonprofit
corporations. A recent trade magazine article summarized the
present state of affairs this way:
"General Accounting Office will make its own evaluation of
Defense Department policies affecting the future of a few
key nonprofit organizations performing design, technical
direction and systems engineering functions for the military
services 'after the dust settles' according to Comptroller
General Joseph Campbell.
"Defense Department has clamped fiscal ceilings on six of
these organizations to prevent their growth and is inviting
increased industry competition in the areas of technical
direction and systems engineering.
"There is a difference of opinion within the Defense Depart-
ment as to what the results will be. Dr. Eugene Fubini,
deputy director of defense research and engineering, expects
the key nonprofit firms to continue at about their present
level of activities. Adam Yarmolinsky, special assistant
to Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara, anticipates that
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sharply diminished defense requirements will dictate an
'unwinding' of some of the organizations, ngtably Aero-
space Corporation and MITRE Corporation."
The various opinions found within the DOD have been
arbitrarily categorized into three separate groups in order to
simplify analysis: (1) federalist position, (2) industrial
position, and (3) industrial objectivity through contract. It
must be noted, however, that many of the opinions were dimensional
and overlapped the boundary lines established within this classi-
fication system.
Federalist Position:
There was a large group in the DOD composed mainly of
career civil servants, who felt strongly that there were certain
functions in the management and control of rederal R&D that were
clearly responsibilities of government that could not be delegated
to a contractor, either nonprofit or profit. These people con-
sidered that the AF had delegated to the nonprofits, policy deci-
sion making responsibilities that could not be delegated. The
term "fictitious relationship" was used by this group to derid6.
Gen. Schriever's contention that the SETD nonprofit use in his
management approach did not represent a dereliction of respon-
sibilities but actually imposed tighter AF control.
The "federalists" were unable to find fault with the official
AF documents that described military-nonprofit relationships.
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They were well written and seemingly described a situation in
which the nonprofit acted in a conceptualizing and advisory
capacity, provided technical input to the military managers of
the system program offices to enable them to make the final
decisions. Unfortunately, this was not a description of the
real world in which the system operated, they contended.
Instead of developing an effective program based on technical
advice from the nonprofits, the situation, according to one
critic"was one in which one individuallthe nonprofit engineer,
justifies and defends the program to us while the military
director is many times unable to answer our queries about the
presentation. The captive has become the captor." Decision
making, they claimed, was in reality done by the nonprofit and
not by the military.
The AF use of the nonprofit hadame a crutch that they were
unwilling to forego. These critics questioned whether a real
effort was made to develop a strong in-house capability and
were generally unaware of AFSC efforts outlined previously.
The reliance and dependence by the Commanders of ESD, BSD and
SSD, according to this group, caused competent and technically
well qualified military and civilian scientists and engineers
assigned to system program offices to play a secondary role
rather than the dominant position they could and should exercise.
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The dangers of a contractual helping hand outside of the
government service was expressed by Dr. Harold Brown, Director
of Defense Development Research and Engineering in an address
in 1961:
"Government policy, like science itself, needs to be
conceived and pursued with some regard for its totality
as well as its parts. By giving priority to the parts -
by turning over the administration of public functions to
private institutions - we have strengthened our ability
to do many separate things, but not our ability to give
integrity and discipline and direction to our total
effort. Indeed by relying too much on the contracting
method we have probably weakened the quality of the
scientists within the civil service, whose help is needed
by the executive who seeks to manage our scientific programs
as a coherent system." 7
This DOD group was not impressed with the unique operational
experience claimed by the nonprofit corporations. Examples were
provided of situations where new program assignments led to
hiring of new people rather than the allocation of old experienced
hands. Cases were cited where the nonprofit showed less flexi-
bility for manpower reassignment than that possible with military
or civil servants. Recent AF experiences at DOD level of pre-
program definition studies prepared by nonprofit corporations had
been "disastrous", according to one administrator. The programs
submitted did not have "impeccable technical content" and, as
a result, AF stated requirements were returned without action
by DOD or the AF was asked to redo their justification.
Criticism was directed also at the high cost of nonprofit
technical manpower. DOD personnel were unable to reconcile
the $40 - $50,000 per manyear cost of Aerospace and MITRE
engineers when industry provided people with comparable skills
at a $20 - $25,000 price. Efforts to quantitatively measure
the type of individual provided by the profit and nonprofit
corporations were unsuccessful. The typical comment was that
for the work effort required the individuals provided by the
profit corporation at half the price were fully capable.
There was a general feeling within this group that the
allowable costs and fees approved for the nonprofits were being
used to provide physical facilities and expensive laboratory
facilities that the AF could not obtain through normal military
programming efforts. Critics were vocal in their belief that
the System Development Laboratory bought by MITRE but belknging
to the AF was a dodge by the AF to obtain an expensive "play-
thing" that they could never justify and obtain defense funding
for through normal programming action.
The fixed costs associated with the sustenance of the non-
profit corporations adversely affected the performance of the
functional divisions of AF Systems Command, they claimed. The
critics contended that these costs forced the Divisions to
allocate work to the nonprofits that could better be accomplished
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in military or industrial laboratories, or by academic insti-
tutions. The flexibility that the AF obtained from nonprofits
was offset by the inflexibility of funding required to keep
the nonprofits "alive". Instead of having a kit of management
techniques available to do specific jobs in the best way
possible, system program managers had little choice but to
depend on one approach - the nonprofit route.
Even with all of its criticism and complaints, however,
this group considered the AF use of systems engineering-technical
direction nonprofits less immoral than the delegation of these
responsibilities by government to industry. Their position
followed the line of reasoning contained in the Third Report
of the House Committee on Government Operations:
"No single weapon - systems contractor, however large his
contract commitments and diversified his industrial re-
sources, can have the breadth of vision, the alertness to
national defense needs, the degree of access to informa-
tion, the choice of alternative systems, the decision-
making responsibilities, and the dedication to the public
interest expected and required of a government agency, and
if the government agency, in this case the Air Force, does
not have the required resources and capabilities to fulfill
its requirements and meet its obligations, it must get them
as best it can.s 8
In summary then, this group contended that government has
certain decision making responsibilities in R&D management
that cannot be delegated. Military and/or civil servants must
make such decisions. The AF has, formally or informally,
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delegated to system engineering-technical direction nonprofits
such responsibilities. They have weakened the military structure,
but more important, they have brought suspicion and criticism
to the whole operation of federal R&D. This group recognized
some problems relating to military or civil service manpower
authorizations to provide the manpower required by the AF to
accomplish its total R&D job; however, this was no justification
for the abdication of certain federal responsibilities to non-
governmental activities. Nonprofit corporations may have to
exist in the system but they must be assigned tasks and managed
to insure that the work they perform is legitimate for non-govern-
mental activities. An important member of the DOD office of
Research and Engineering stated, "their management is a bigger
problem that their technological contributions."
Industrial Position:
The centralization of military decision making at DOD
level led to a great expansion of the department's work force.
Many of the key positions in DOD were filled not by career
civil servants but by well qualified individuals recruited
from industry and universities. These individuals, with an
extensive knowledge of industrial capability, considered that
the continued AF dependence on nonprofit corporations usurped
responsibilities that could better be accomplished by industry.
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This group conceded that the establishment of R-W in 1954
as the SETD of the ballistic missile program was warranted, if
for no other reason than the void within industry of a systems
capability. One DOD representative asserted that "industry
defaulted its rights to the systems-engineering job in the
1950's", and then continued, "but the same situation does not
exist in the 1960's". The key aerospace and electronics
companies successfully implemented large weapon system pro-
grams, recognized the need for a systems approach, and have
accumulated the skills and assistance of capable, competent
scientists and engineers for multidisciplinary systems tasks.
Competence, experience, and understanding of system problems
provided within industry "centers of excellence" that were
capable of competing with nonprofits.
In the development of weapon systems there was a proper
place and function for the scientific and technical resources
of government in-house laboratories, SETD nonprofits and
industry. The problem that existed, the industrial group
claimed, was the failure to understand the proper role of each
of these organizations. They recognized the government's respon-
sibility for determining and characterizing weapon needs; the
fact that in-house laboratories did not always have the talent,
resources and environment to perform this task; and the assistance
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provided by nonprofit s to apepfdri a government function. This
group supported the following statement that appeared in the
Holst Report to the Holifield Committee Hearings in 1962:
"It is essential that these organizations recognize their
responsibilities and proper spheres of operating, and the
resulting limitations on their freedom of operation. They
are needed as idea creating or conceptualizing entities,
or as evaluators of the concepts of others. They are not
themselves charged with the responsibility for the defense
of the Nation or operation of its defensive systems. It is-
the Government, through the military Services, or otherwise,
who must actually defend the Nation, and consequently must
have the responsible and final role in the specification
of the needed systems, components and related materials.
Similarly, it is the Government which must undertake actual
procurement, test, installation, and evaluation, and sub-
sequently the operation of the system." 9
Our economy and the greatest technological strength within
the nation existed in the staffs and facilities of profit seeking
industrial facilities, this group maintained. This private base
of technological strength must continue and grow. The assignment
of tasks that were not inherent responsibilities of government
to nonprofit corporations inhibited this growth.
Innovation and creativity were not noted as strong attributes
of the nonprofits by this group. In fact, they argued that the
systems competence of many industrial activities generally ex-
ceeded those of nonprofits because of their widely diversified
interests and operations. Innovation, especially in military
weapon systems, appeared to result most often at the interface
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of the engineering and physical sciences. The broad scope of
large industrial activities brought together scientists of
diverse backgrounds and interests working on varied problems
and offered greater potential for discovery at the interfaces
of science and engineering than might be attainable in nonprofit
activities that were more specifically aligned to one specific
field of endeavor.
The position of this group can be summarized as arguing
for a definite limitation of jobs assigned to the nonprofit.
It accepted the position of Max Golden, former General Counsel
of the AF, who debunked the concept that the nonprofits usurped
the legitimate function of government and argued: "so far as
Aerospace is concerned, is that it fills a rdle that has been
filled by private industry, not Government, since the earliest
days of aircraft." 10 Industry was ready and able to take back
those functions and tasks that legitimately belonged to them.
The major problem facing industry in assuming their "proper
role", according to one member of this group, was their "dicho-
tomy of personality". He continued, "they want to be a partner
not a mistress; however, they can't make up their mind whether
they want to be protected or evaluated on performance."
Industrial Objectivity Through Contract:
Individual conflict of interest had been a perennial govern-
ment concern. The AF experiences with R-W in the ballistic
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missile program brought to a head the problem of organizational
conflict of interest. The result, indicated in Chapter III, was
the divorce of R-W from future SETD work in the AF ballistic
missile and space programs. If industry was to regain that
role for government now performed by MITRE and Aerospace
Corporations, two conditions had to be satisfied: (1) from
government's view, the organization must provide impartial,
technically sound and objective assistance and advice; and
(2) from the standpoint of the rest of the industir, that
company performing the role must not be able to gain unfair
competitive advantage.
In the view of some DOD personnel, DOD Directive 5500.10
entitled "Prescribing Rules for the Avoidance of Organizational
Conflicts of Interest", issued in June 1963, provided the con-
tractual vehicle by which industry could resume many of the
functions now performed by SETD nonprofits. This directive
was developed by Mr. Adam Yarmolinsky, special assistant to the
Secretary of Defense. In this effort he was assisted by the
Defense Industry Advisory Council (DIAC), an industry group
formed in 1962 to act in an advisory role to the Secretary of
Defense on industry relations.
The development of a code of conduct for contractors,
although under consideration for some time, was expedited to
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respond to the recommendation of the Bell Committee Report of
1962. That report stated that one of the prime considerations
of government agencies in deciding whether to do R&D in-house or
to contract it out was "avoiding assignment of work which would
create inherent conflicts of interest." Four rules of conduct
were outlined in DOD Directive 5500.10 to avoid organizational
conflicts of interest:
"1. If a contractor agrees to provide systems engineering
and technical direction (SE/TD) for a system, without at
the same time assuming overall contractual responsibility
for: (a) development, or (b) integration, assembly, and
checkout (IAC), or (c) production of the system, then that
contractor shall not later be allowed to supply the system
or any major components thereof, or to be a subcontractor
or consultant to a supplier of the system or any major
components thereof..."
"12. If a contractor agrees to prepare and furnish complete
specifications covering non-developmental items to be used
in competitive procurement, that contractor shall not be
allowed to furnish such items, either as a prime or sub-
contractor, for a reasonable period of time including, at
least, the initial procurement ...
"3. If a single contractor, other than a company which has
participated in the development or design of a system, agrees
to assist the DOD or a contractor of the DOD in the prepara-
tion of a statement of work, or agrees to provide material
leading directly, predictably, and without delay to a state-
ment of work, to be used in the competitive procurement of
a system or services, that contractor shall not be allowed
to supply the services, or the system or major components
thereof, unless he is the sole source...
"4. If a contractor agrees to conduct studies or provide
advice concerning a system, which work requires access to
proprietary data of other companies, the contractor must
agree with such companies to protect such data from
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unauthorized use or disclosure so long as it remains
proprietary."? 11
The directive also noted the role of the nonprofit corpora-
tion and made these comments about the future need to create
additional nonprofits.
"It is the policy of the Department of Defense that such
organizations are created only under extraordinary cir-
cumstances, when private resources are not available to
accomplish a necessary objective beyond the scope of in-
house capabilities. Their termination is governed by the
organic statutes of the individual organizations. These
rules should make it even less likely that any additional
Government-financed nonprofit organizations need be created.
While these organizations are in existence they will be
treated by the Department on arms length basis, as the
rules prescribe." 12
The publication of DOD Directive 5500.10 resulted in an
effort by the AF to amend existing contracts to embody the
terms of the directive. One of the ESD contracts amended was
with the ITT Communications Services, Inc. (ICS), a wholly
owned subsidiary of International Telephone and Telegraph Corp.
(ITT). Under this contract, ICS provided management, systems
engineering, design and development of the 480 L program, a
global AF communications system. Within the DOD, a separate
contract was written by the DCA with ITT Intelcom, a wholly
owned subsidiary of ITT, to provide technical support in nuclear
detection systems, the national military command system, counter-
measure techniques, andother defense electronics areas. This
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contract also embodied the provisions of DOD Directive 5500.10.
In November 1964, ITT announced the sale of ICS and Intelcom
to Computer Sciences, Inc. Mr. Harold S. Geneen, president of
ITT advised that the two activities were sold "to avoid the
possibility of a conflict of interest with the business of
other ITT companies engaged in the supply of military communica-
tions equipment to the U.S. Government." 13
Strong industry opposition and possible difficulties with
the restrictions of the directive were recognized by DOD spokes-
men of this group. However, these individuals considered that
the initial impact was wearing off and that industry was
acclimating itself to the new rules as defense and space pro-
duction contracts declined. The award ofamajor contract to
Space Technology Laboratorie3 (STL) of Thompson Ramo-Woolridge
to provide systems integration and developmental test support
for the Navy's anti-submarine warfare systems project (ASW) was
cited to prove their point. An announcement of this award was
noted in an article in Missiles and Rockets, which stressed the
fact that an unusually tough hardware exclusion clause had been
accepted by STL:
"Prohibiting a company from bidding on components or systems
for which they have served as a systems engineering or coni
sultant to the government agency is not new in itself-Aero-
space Corp., working for the AF, Intercom (sic. Intelcom)
working for the Defense Communications Agency and Bellcom
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and the General Electric Apollo Support Operations for
NASA are all examples of companies that have accepted such
clauses. Most of these, however, are special children of
the parent organizations, specially created to perform the
specific job. Hardware exclusion, as a rule, does not apply
to other members of the same corporate family.
"In the contract negotiated with STL, however, the hard-
ware exclusion clause extends not only to the actual group
doing the ASW work but to the parent company, its affiliates
and divisions. Thus no unit of TRW will be able to bid on
Navy ASW hardware." 14
The overall position of this group in the DOD Was summarized
in an article in the December 21, 1964 issue of Aviation Week and
Space Technology. Mr. Yarmolinsky, according to this article,
maintained that DOD Directive 5500.10 permitted profit making
corporations to compete for SETD roles if given the opportunity.
This was not to imply, however, that MITRE and Aerospace Corpora-
tions could be phased out immediately. The article continued
that Mr. Yarmolinsky considered "their 'immediate future'
assured because of their competence in the essential work they
are now carrying on." In the long run , however, "the need
for these few organizations should 'sharply diminish' as industry
becomes more confident of its ability to perform under the new
rules, and Defense Department strengthens its own in-house
capability." He considered their demise in their present govern-
ment role inevitable and "suggested these three possibilities -
abandon nonprofit status and 'go commercial'; apply their
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resources to government work in non-defense fields, or disband,
with cohesive teams arranging for other employment."11 15
Industry Looks at the Nonprofits:
In order to determine how industry viewed the SETD nonprofits
today, a series of interviews were held with people in companies
that had worked on projects in which MITRE and/or Aerospace had
SETD responsibilities. Most of the interviews were with the key
manager or chief executive of the company; in some cases, there
were a number of interviews in the company ranging from executive
level down through line project managers. The sample of eight
companies is not considered exhaustive; however, it is a
reasonable sample from which to evaluate industrial convictions
of the nonprofit role. Although the technique employed was the
personal interview, a questionnaire was used as a guide to lead
the discussion into avenues considered of prime importance and
to insure that the same questions were asked each individual
interviewed.
The use of a personal interview as the principal method
of material gathering enabled the investigator to develop a
"feel" for the trials and tribulations of companies dependent
upon the defense business. One of the executives interviewed
used this sentence to describe the system: "It's a helluva
card game, but it's the only one in town." Industry-
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government relationships was a subject near and dear to the
hearts of everyone interviewed and this method permitted discus-
sion of points and clarification of issues that might become
clouded or distorted through use of the written questionnaire
only. The give and take of the interview provided a better
understanding of the multifaceted relationship existing between
government and industry in a constantly changing environment.
Legitimacy of Nonprofit Role:
A series of questions were first asked to determine if the
SETD role performed by the nonprofits for the AF was considered
a legitimate role. As indicated in Chart 17, there was a diver-
sity of opinion. Those who denied the legitimacy of the nonprofit
corporations were vociferous and outspoken in their opinions.
They generally saw no place in the industry-government scheme
of things for the nonprofit. On the other hand, those who saw
a need for the nonprofit generally qualified or hedged .ihtedir
reply. Three answered that as long as the AF used an associate
method of contracting, nonprofits were required as integrators
and referees for the associates; however, they seriously
questioned whether the associate contractor route was the best
approach to AF R&D today.
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CHART 17
LEGITIMACY OF NONPROFIT ROLE
Yes Qualified Yes No
Is the nonprofit
role legitimate? 2 3 3
"Yes" Answer Basis Yes No
Objectivity 4 1
Unique Competence 0 5
Elite Skills 0 5
Access to Privileged
Information 2 3
Flexibility 3 2
None of the individuals interviewed considered that non-
profits represented a "unique competence" or contained "elite
skills" as claimed in official Air Force documents. The com-
ments on the calibre of people employed by the nonprofits
ranged from well qualified to "I wouldn't hire 50% of the men
working there." The most outspoken criticism of the nonprofit
capabilities came from the executive level and the degree of
criticism dropped materially as one spoke to 2ine managers 'who
had intimate dealings with the scientists and engineers of
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MITRE and Aerospace. If one measured technical and management
competence on a scale from 0 to 1, from incapable to highly
capable, it was noted that the executives tended to place over-
all capabilities at the low end while line managers saw the
nonprofit competence as being much higher.
Those that considered the nonprofit role legitimate stressed
the need for government or its authorized agent to be objective.
In this regard, all considered that the nonprofit fit this
characteristic. Only one company was willing to evaluate the
impact of DOD Directive 5500.10; however, this company had
attempted to perform contractually under a hardware restrictive
clause and found that the dollars for hardware far outweighed
the dollars that were available for contractual R&D.
Two of the companies considered that the access of nonprofits
to privileged information an important attribute. In both cases,
the companies employed marketing engineers in Washington and at
the different AFSC divisions who were responsible to feedback
military planning and technical interest items to the home office.
While this espionage system was effective, information feedback
tended to be delayed or distorted through handling. The people
interviewed envied the rble of MITRE and Aerospace engineers who
had ready access to up-to-date planning data and intimate contact
with the military customer. It was noted that the DOD use of
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preprogram definition phase contracts with a snall number of
capable contractors would allow some industrial groups to be
briefed by the military on advanced plans and permitted access
to classified documents.
One of the companies opposed to the nonprofits debunked the
objectivity issue and insisted that not only corporate objectivity
must be considered but also the objectivity of the people in the
nonprofits and their use of industrial privileged information
after they terminated their nonprofit employment. He advised
that he could cite actual situations where nonprofit employees
left the company and carried with them privileged information
that was passed on to their new employers. He contrasted this
with profit making consultants, such as Arthur D. Little, Inc.
who worked for competing major industries at the same time and
their integrity and trustworthiness in safeguarding privileged
information was unquestioned. He therefore, considered industry
more capable of maintaining secrecy in handling proprietary
information than nonprofits.
Air Force Capability:
The industrial opponents of nonprofits considered that MITRE
and Aerospace Corporations usurped both government and industrial
functions. All of the group interviewed doubted the validity of
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Gen. Schriever's position that the AF gained greater management
control through using the nonprofits. These people considered
that the AF had lost control Comments were received ranging
from "consultants should not be used to direct you"., to
"they are bigger and stronger than their customers and have
access to higher Air Force levels than the Commanders of the
AFSC divisions they are supposed to support."
All of those interviewed were asked to evaluate whether the
AF capability to manage SETD nonprofits had increased or de-
creased in the past two years. Only two of the eight companies
considered that AF capabilities had increased. Although most
contended that it depended on the personalities involved, six
of the companies stated that the overall military capability had
declined. They attributed the decline to the separation of good,
experienced senior people and their replacement with formally
educated but systems inexperienced younger officers. The latter
were thrown into the middle of $20 to $100 million programs and
in self defense began to lean on the nonprofits for continuity,
stability and protection. In some instances, they asserted,
a strong military figure arrived on the scene anxious and
willing to be the decision maker. In general, he found that
he was looked upon by his military superior as technically
inferior to nonprofit personnel. Since mistakes in these
programs were so costly and since he found fighting the system
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difficult, the military man considered it advantageous and
"safer" to play a more subservient role and to let the non-
profit control the decision making. The result, according to
this industrial group was a noticeable weakening of the military
position to control the nonprofits.
General Systems Engineering:
In his testimony before the Holifield Committee in 1962,
Dr. Getting commented that "industry during the past decade
had increased greatly its technical competence in the missile
and space fields. As a result, it should no longer be necessary
for us to get into as much detail of a contractor's engineering
effort as previously was required." The change in the official
documents to the expression, "general systems engineering" (GSE)
rather than "systems engineering" was designed to reflect Dr.
Getting's position. Industry maintained that the actions of the
SETD nonprofits belied the words. All of the companies com-
plained that there was greater interference in their business by
the nonprofit than ever before. All of those interviewed were
extremely critical of the failure of the nonprofits to know
when to stay out of the contractor's hair. The nonprofits were
getting involved in areas that were basically production rather
than design problems, areas in which there was no question of
the superiority of industrial competence.
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Instability of Nonprofit Managers:
One of the key industries in the space business was extremely
critical of nonprofit interference and of the failure of non-
profits to stabilize people on key projects. Nonprofits maintained
that one of their strengths was their stability of personnel and
low turnover rates. This company maintained that although the
engineers did not leave the employ of the nonprofit there was
unusual shifting of key project people from one job to another.
In less than a year on a major program in which they were an
associate contractor there had been three shifts of chief pro-
ject engineer. This led to a continuous series of familiariza-
tion briefings for the new nonprofit manager and more frequent
phasing group meetings to review "old" iroblems. The result
was that the company found that 20 or 30 of their engineers were
always busy to acquaint nonprofit newcomers with the program. A
study conducted by this company revealed that more than 20 man-
years of engineering time was devoted to familiarization brief-
ings of new military or nonprofit personnel, a costly and program
delaying effort.
Nonprofit Vested Interest:
Even those that considered objectivity a key factor in
favor of nonprofit use were critical of the tendency of these
activities to favor in-house ideas in which they had a vested
interest rather than outside ideas that might be beneficial for
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for the overall system. While it was agreed that it was an
inherent characteristic of individuals and companies to want
recognition, the point was made that because nonprofits were not
recognized for ultimate system performance they "pushed" their
technical ideas to build up a reputation. This unique personal-
ity of the nonprofit then manifested itself in ways that ad-
versely affected total system performance. Examples were given
of cases where the nonprofit made a valuable contribution to the
state-of-the-art in subsystem development. This subsystem was
always advocated and a continuous modernization and upgrading
program was initiated in this area because of nonprofit interest.
The point was made that evaluation of the contractor's perform-
ance was measured in terms of compatibility with the nonprofit
subsystem rather than on a quantitative analysis of the con-
tractor's contribution to the total system. Some of the in-
dustrial group insisted that the nonprofits discouraged the
military from supporting further development of industrial sub-
systems that conflicted with nonprofit vested interests.
Industry Cooperation With Prime Contractor:
One of the key arguments for nonprofit use when a broad
base of industrial technical competence was required, was the
AF claim that industrial concerns would hesitate to divulge
information to a competitor. As a result the argument was made
that a prime contractor approach discouraged subcontractors and
industry, in general, from making a major contribution to the
program. The response of the companies to the following ques-
tions is enlightening:
(1) Can industry, through a prime contractor method or some
other contractual arrangement, provide objective SETD for major
weapon system development?
(2) Would your company be willing to cooperate (more, less
or the same) with another contractor having SETD responsibility
as compared to the nonprofit?
Seven of the eight companies responded "yes" to the first
query. The one objector considered that SETD was a government
responsibility that could not be delegated to either a profit
or a nonprofit corporation. The other companies advised they
would be willing to cooperate with a prime contractor to the
same or a greater degree than they would with the nonprofit. Two
of the companies qualified the degree of cooperation with state-
ments that it depended on the contractor involved and their
past experiences and dealings with the contractor. There was
a noticeable tendency to minimize the value of proprietary
information in today's environment. The companies maintained
that technology was advancing so rapidly that the life span of
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new ideas did not seem to exceed six months. They recognized
that to stay in business they had to continuously divulge ideas
to the rest of industry. They would prefer di'vulging ideas to
a prime contractor because of their ability to talk a "common"
language and because prime contractors had greater flexibility
to contract than the government. Thus in the "rat race" of
the defense business today, the industrial group sampled was
more willing to return to a prime contractor way of doing business
than to continue with the AF approach of associate contractors.
This position was not only based on their growing competence,
their belief that a "prime" was capable of acting as integrator
as well as or better than the nonprofit because of their "close-
ness to the problem", but also as a matter of contractual "self
interest."
Motivation of Nonprofits:
There was a wide range of ideas expressed as to the motiva-
tion of a nonprofit corporation which was not faced with the
drive of competition or the motivation of profits. How important
is competition? Here the companies were almost unanimous that
the competition in the aerospace and electronics business today
was a vital force in their drive to stay ahead of the state-of-
the-art. They considered that technical innovation resulted
from their continuous search to do the job better, to stay ahead
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of the competition. Thus, they looked at the nonprofits as
being "nonmotivated", as a group that "made things conform to
convenience", as "academic people that were unable to manage
a program calling for output". One company called them "sterile"
insofar as innovation was concerned, and another used the tech-
nical phrase "narrow banded" to describe their interests.
On the other hand, the motivation of profit to military
R&D brought interesting responses. One company was upset by the
continued use of the word "nonprofit" to describe MITRE and
Aerospace Corporations. In their view the word conveyed the
erroneous connotation that this was a cheaper way of doing or
managing R&D. They preferred the adoption of the word "non-
dividend" to replace "nonprofit". The emphasis placed on the
impact of the profit motive varied inversely with the role the
individual played in the organizational hierarchy. Key executives
emphasized the profit motive as an important driving element;
line program managers tended to disregard or minimize profit.
The program managers contended that SETD technical recommenda-
tions whether provided by profit or nonprofit organizations,
generally were given by people who were rarely cognizant of the
profit aspects of their recommendation.
This position was well illustrated during an interview with
an AF officer, who had been actively involved in the Minuteman
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program office. In describing the military, STL and contractor
organizational structures that existed to support Minuteman he
described the situation where the STL engineers would urge an
expensive technical approach and would receive overwhelming
associate contractor and military support at the engineering
levels. The concerted engineering staffs "ganged up" and
refused to budge from their position even when faced with the
trade off analysis of a great cost versus small technical improve-
ment. His point was that military and contractor engineers em-
phasized technical objectives of reliability, accuracy, and
technical goals rather than cost or profit. Dollar decisions
were made at a higher management level than that of the sci-
entist and engineer actually responsible for a small piece of
the total project.
Proposed Role of SETD Nonprofits:
From a long range standpoint, two of the eight companies saw
no need for the nonprofit in any aspect of R&D management. They
urged the early phase out of nonprofit responsibilities and the
dissolution of the corporations. The other six companies wanted
to limit the future nonprofit role to assisting the AF in ad-
vanced planning and conceptualization of weapons. They would
then act as a bridge between military needs and changing technol-
ogy, advising the AF and assisting them in writing the requests
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for proposals (RFP) for industry action.
One company suggested that the nonprofits retain people in
the field with operating military activities so that they could
better understand military field problems. They could then pro-
vide qualified technical evaluation at the basic requirements
stage that would be channeled upward through R&D channels. This
approach was in sharp contrast to the present red tape bound
system of trying to push change through military operational
channels before they finally arrived at the R&D side for analy-
sis and feasibility. Today, it takes years of paperwork and
review to arrive at this point, and even when the problem was
transferred to the R&D people, they had little understanding or
"feel" for the operational problem. This proposed system would
be similar to one instituted in OSRD days when scientists lived
with and participated in field exercises.
The R&D part of the budget program package system was
divided into six categories: research, exploratory development,
advanced development, engineering development, operational
systems development and management and support. Today, within
the AF management approach to R&D, the nonprofit played a role
in each of the six categories. The six companies that see a
continuance of SETD nonprofits would restrict their role to one
category, exploratory development. The companies opposed the
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nonprofit need for extensive laboratory facilities and argued
that basic and applied research was the legitimate function of
universities and industry. Not only was this a malassignment
of responsibility but the allocation of funds to the nonprofits
for specific research problems denied investigation of such
problems to universities and industrial laboratories. In
this way it denied the knowledge to the innovative organiza-
tions that could make the best payoff use of the investigations,
this group contended.
Once the AF with the help of nonprofits determined the
feasibility of new technology and defined development objectives
in broad general terms, industry would be assigned the respon-
sibilities for advanced engineering development. The AF,
according to this industrial group, would exercise overall manage-
ment responsibility over the contractor's efforts and would
work directly with the contractor in operational systems develop-
ment and preparation for eventual military operation, maintenance
and support of the operational weapon system.
Industry considered that the AF adoption of such a manage-
ment approach would permit a substantial reduction of MITRE
and Aerospace personnel and physical facilities. The corpora-
tions could then be reduced to between 500-600 scientists and
engineers, about the level of RAND Corporation. By attaining
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such a personnel level and by restricting their AF role,
industry considered that the nonprofits would escape constant
Congressional criticism and review. At the same time the AF
would make the best use of the scientific and technical talents
found in industry, the universities, and the military.
Aerospace and MITRE Look at Themselves:
Aerospace and MITRE were creations of the AF. More than
95 percent of their funds were obtained from AF work. They
were prohibited from competing for work and coordination with
the AF was required before they were permitted to accept assign-
ments from other governmental agencies. At the same time, the
AF recognized their responsibility to guarantee the nonprofits
stability and well being.
Under such a contractual arrangement it would be foolhardy
for either Aerospace or MITRE to publicly indicate dissatisfaction
of their role. Their future, as previously indicated, was
already clouded by DOD actions to limit their size and allow
industry to compete with them for system engineering and tech-
nical direction jobs. Congressional and industrial pressures
were unrelenting; the General Accounting Office persisted in a
belief that SETD tasks performed by the nonprofits should be
performed in-house by the AF. The nonprofit official and public
relations view of their role was necessarily that expressed by
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the AF and described in part 1 of this chapter.
There was no doubt, however, that beneath the surface of
agreement with the AF, there were serious differences of opinion.
The problem they faced was how to reflect this disagreement.
In the current environment, failure to show strong agreement
with the AF might be tantamount to a death warrant. On the
other hand, continuation of the existing course might prolong
the agony but would eventually lead to their destruction.
The nonprofits paid a great deal of attention to the criticism
swirling around them. There were times when they indicated that
they considered it of little value to respond to their critics.
Unfortunately, the AF was unable to sit back and allow the
charges against them to go unanswered. Whether they liked it
or not, the nonprofits found themselves spending considerable
time and effort justifying their existence.
The nonprofits recognized that the environment of the 1960's
was very different than that of the 1950's, the era in which
they were conceived. They recognized that program decision
making the-n unilaterally made by the AF, was now being done by
DOD; none of the programs today had the sense of urgency and
priority of ballistic missiles; the freedom from bureaucratic
red tape that existed in the early days of the missile program
had long disappeared; industry had developed a systems capability
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that was strong, capable and anxious to tackle all jobs; and
hostility to their effort was not restricted to industry and
Congress but also found within the DOD and the military services.
Their only strong advocate was their creator, the AF. However,
they were concerned that the AF persisted in using the argu-
ments of the 1950's to justify their existence.
Extensions of Government:
The nonprofits considered the jobs they performed as an
extension of government functions that were the responsibilities
of government and not industry. This position was expressed
in 1961 by Dr. Allen F. Donovan, Senior Vice President for
Aerospace Corporation, in an interview reported by the trade
magazine, Aerospace Management.
"The question is basically: How do we in a capitalistic
system provide the government with certain types of
technical skills? What does government want? Creative
people work best in certain environments, typically a
university. The better scientists and engineers prefer
to work where they can present constructive criticisms,
where their function in society can be understood.
"Aerospace Corporation provides the right atmosphere for
creative scientific and engineering people wanting to
advance technically with the rapidly changing technologies.
The bulk of these people will not work in the military or
civil service. The purpose of the military has been to
preserve the status quo. This is basically contrary to
the scientific spirit. Technical objectivity is very
difficult to achieve anywhere, and you do not have to
make a profit to have it."
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The nonprofits saw no immediate change in status, neither
growth nor severe reductions were forecast. This position was
based on a belief that no one was prepared to take over their
job. The AF had been unable to buildup its in-house capabilities
and claimed that conditions were getting worse; nothing had come
of the Bell Report recommendation to consider the establishment
of a new kind of a federal institution that would replicate
the more positive attributes of the nonprofits; and means had
not been developed to permit industry to assume the nonprofit
role. DOD Directive 5500.10 might be considered an approach in
the right direction, they claimed, but it did not satisfy the
objectivity demands of government nor the "sterility of competi-
tion" demanded by industry.
Bureaucratic Hardening of the Arteries:
The nonprofits conceded the growth of industrial systems
capability; however, this fact did not mean that the expertise
and competence they possessed was of less importance. The
nonprofits attracted high level people from both an educational
and experience standpoint; they were capable of doing important
work in an era of rapidly changing technologies.
The nonprofits complained that the stresses and strains in
the system posed by their critics^who are interested in dissolving
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thim led to a "bureaucratic hardening of the arteries". In
order to "sanitize" the system to satisfy their critics, some
nonprofit personnel indicated, the AF imposed restructions,
policies and procedures that made it difficult to "recognize the
nonprofit from another government agency." Every interview with
nonprofit personnel eventually came to this major point of con-
tention: they were being stifled from making the scientific
and technical contributions they were capable of providing.
The nonprofits considered the administrative details a distasteful
burden and felt that they were floundering in a sea of restric-
tions, much like the situation described by Admiral Rickover
in a speech given in 1958:
"We think every organization profits by introducing what
we term 'business methods'. But a businesslike attitude
makes for efficiency only in purely routine matters. It
is disastrous when applied to creative people whether they
work in an educational institution, research center or a
government department.
"I fear that we have gone far toward lowering the output
of our brain-workers by over-organizing them. We are
drowning in paperwork. We are talking ourselves in a
standstill in endless committees - those pets of the
administrators. We are losing the genius for improvisa-
tion ... We have been diluting responsibility for making
decisions by piling layers of supervisory administrative
levels, pyramid fashion, on top of the people who do the
real work." 17
The nonprofits stated that they reorganized and aligned
their manpower to fit the needs of the three divisions of the
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AFSC they supported. The AF wanted them to assume a strong
project oriented position and they acceded to the military
requests even though they knew it was costly in manpower and
dollars and diluted their technical capabilities. This
"fractionalization of effort" to support individual projects
rather than total workload, they contended, resulted in a
rapid increase in personnel. Simultaneously, it led to an
increase in administrative and procedural machinery to accom-
modate the contractual complexities of the effort. The non-
profits recognized that, to a large extent, they were providing
"warm bodies to do AF work". Their growth was a key element of
Congressional and industrial criticism; however, they stated
they tried unsuccessfully to combat this growth by asking the
AF to assume more realistic policies and practices.
Many of the original members of the nonprofits, who joined
their companies from STL and MIT, were dissatisfied with the
constraints placed on them by the AF. They advised that the
"creative environment" they had in their previous environment
and which was to be retained in the SETD nonprofits was "more
fiction than fact."
Aerospace and MITRE worked for DOD, NASA, FAA and other
Federal agencies, but to a very limited degree. The nonprofits
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have not attempted to market their services and as indicated at
the start of this chapter they were prohibited from accepting
assignments from other governmental agencies without AF coordina-
tion. Nonprofit executives advised that when they suggested
the need to change this restrictive policy, their Trustees took
the position that it would be foolish to leave AF sponsorship and
security without having another "bird on hand". As one individual
explained, the Trustees considered that "if we are as good as
we think we are someone higher up in the chain of authority will
recognize us and call on us to do a more important task." Un-
fortunately, these executives stated, the work performed by
MITRE or Aerospace could not be considered "monuments to our
greatness" in the same way that R-W could point to their
"monuments of Atlas, Titan, Thor and Minuteman". As a result,
they claimed, neither NASA nor DOD was clamoring for their
services.
The 1964 annual report showed that Aerospace had an income
from contracts including fees exceeding $79 million; MITRE had
total revenues of over $38 million. An initial reaction after
reviewing the continuous growth of these companies, their privi-
leged and favored-son position that permitted growth without
being involved in the rat race of defense procurement might
well be: What are these people complaining about?
Within the nonprofits there were technically strong and
dedicated personalities who considered that they had an import-
ant role to play in weapon system development. They st'ated
that unless they found a way to resist the AF policies to
"institutionalize" them, they would not exist to accomplish
that scientific work required in a period of national emergency.
As long as the issues - that the nation had reached a technologi-
cal plateau in weapon development or that the political situa-
tion precluded continuous strivings for technological super-
iority in weapons - were questionable, these executives em-
phasized that the SETD nonprofits represented a valuable
national resource that should be sustained.
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CHAPTER VI
EVALUATION
"Changing ideas, circumstances, and understandings have
repeatedly presented challenges to government for which
past activities and methods appeared inadequate or in -
appropriate, For good or ill, modifications have con-
tinually been made in what government has done and how
it has gone about it. Typically, such changes have
occurred as a composite outcome of the political process -
the fruit of a host of forces at play during a particular
time - rather than as a result of a well-reasoned, deliberate
appraisal of what their implication might be." - Carl F.
Stover 1
Ballistic Missile Success:
The AF in developing a management system for the ballistic
missile program emphasized, as no one before that time had done,
the concept of systems management and brought to that concept
three important and radical techniques: associate contractor
method, a separate corporation to perform systems engineering
and technical direction, and concurrency. The host of forces
at play at the time, the national priority, the technological
complexity, the urgency of getting an operational system in
being as soon as possible, justified the radical innovations
initiated by the AF at the WDD, later renamed the BMD in
California.
If one was to define the business of WDD and its comander
it would have been to provide the nation with operational
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ICBM's at the earliest possible date. The system employed by
the AF was eminently successful. Highly complex missiles
were developed, produced and installed; military systems of
logistics were established; and military personnel were trained
to use the weapon system. Investigation supported the AF posi-
tion that no other system then employed, whether a government
in-house arsenal, an industrial prime contractor, or assignment
to a university laboratory, would have been as successful in
satisfying the total requirements of development, installation,
and operational readiness.
The forces at play during that particular time under those
particular conditions called for the AF approach. The recommenda-
tions of the von Neumann Committee and the missionary zeal of
Gen. Schriever in bringing reality to these recommendations
were clairvoyant and worthy of the highest praise.
Institutionalization of Success:
Dr. Henry Kissinger stated that "nothing stultifies military
thought as much as a victorious war, for innovation must run the gaunt-
let~ ofinertia legitimized by success."2 The war for prime
military roles and mission was won by the AF in the 1950's. By
the late fifties, stultification had started and innovation
discouraged by the "institutionalization" of the "successful"
system. In its simplest form, the concept was that if management
techniques worked for ballistic missiles they could obviously
be employed for other efforts of the Air Research and Develop-
ment Command (ARDC) and later the AFSC. Little consideration
was given to the fact that the forces at play were different,
that conditions had changed. The military leaders failed to
make a "well-reasoned, deliberate appraisal of what the impli-
cations might be." There were people in the BMD, as indicated
in Chapter III, who saw the dangers of "institutionalizing"
the WDD system. Their protests, however, were to no avail and
it was impossible to stop the movement to jump on the "Schriever
bandwagon of success".
At top management level within private industry the chief
executive generally was granted wide latitude and freedom of
action in conducting business affairs as long as the objectives
established by the board or the stockholders were met. These
objectives were normally defined in terms of profit. In a
public position of trust, this freedom of action was subject
to many more restrictions and the objectives clouded by secondary
political and economic considerations. However, during periods
of stress, whether actual war or in times of national emergency,
the chief executive of both public and private institutions was
judged on his ability to attain objectives. As soon as the
emergency was over, however, the public official might find
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himself castigated and criticized for the methods employed,
manpower and dollar costs associated with getting the job done -
matters that were considered secondary during the emergency.
Thus, in the initial stages of the ballistic missile
program no one argued against the concept of concurrency.
Concurrency gave you things in a hurry but it was a very ex-
pensive way of developing a system, The dollar overruns
associated with the early ballistic missile program were indica-
tive of the added costs incurred by the concurrency concept. At
the time the costs were inCurred, fewt persons complained; how-
ever, as soon as an umbrella of strength was provided by the
development of a strategic misslie force, urgency was no longer
a prime consideration. By 1958, Congressmen, industrialists
and rival military chiefs were taking potshots at Gen. Schriever
and the WVDD methods. Charges of waste and mismanagement were
hurled at the ballistic missile program. The reaction of the AF
to this criticism was to place stxong administrative and fiscal
controls on the R&I) management.
Myth of Freedom from Red Tape
Many political scientists stressed freedom from red tape
and bureaucratic administrative procedires as key factors in
the development of nonprofit corporations. Dr. Don K. Price
noted that during his early years of government service in
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WWII he "used to propose facetiously that certain government
departments could be organized and managed efficiently only if
they were officially abolished as such and then privately
incorporated in Delaware, but at that time I did not have the
imagination to see that almost exactly this procedure would be
followed."3 A similar idea of circumvention of established
procedures and systems by the scientific community was expressed
by Dr. Robert L. Wood:
"But the institutionalization of the first ad hoc think
groups into permanent corporations, the perpetuation of
the great governmental laboratories and the continued
preference for a university environment in which to con-
duct sponsored research attest to the substantial modifi-
cations which scientists have made to conventional con-
cepts of administrative theory. In the name of protecting
scientific integrity they have secured for themselves con-
ditions of administrative discretion which contradict
ancient principles of hierarchy, chain of command and span
of control. With powerful ideological assistance from
the American free enterprise tradition, scientists and
engineers and universities and defense industries have
contributed mightily to the destruction of the govern-
mental agency and business corporation as meaningful
entities in the development and execution of public pro-
grams. The present array of research and development
halfway houses born of system analysis are monuments to
their ingenuity and to their success in escaping the
established modes of organization."4
This simple model of the nonprofit institution as being the
result of the ingenuity of the scientists, failed to give proper
emphasis to the other forces at work that were described in
Chapter II. The force that breathed life into the SETD
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corporations, whether profit or nonprofit, was the military.
The military concern in the 1950's - to provide an operational
ballistic missile at the earliest possible date - was one that
enabled them to extend the type of freedom to the SETD corpora-
tion that the scientists considered desirable. Once the missile
was operational and the sense of urgency gone, internal and
external pressures were exerted on the AF, which caused them
to change policies. They were no longer willing or able to
allow their contractors the same freedom of action and the sys-
tem rapidly became "institutionalized."
The R-W Corporation &nd the MIT Lincoln Laboratory func-
tioned during the period of greatest productivity, of major
innovation in ballistic missiles and command and control sys-
tems. Their technical decisions were made in a heady atmosphere
of "freedom" from administrative and budgetairy controls. Ad-
mittedly, "freedom" must be qualified to indicate that some
restrictions existed; but they were relatively minor when com-
pared to the administrative red tape that were applied to MITRE
and Aerospace.
These corporations were never given the freedom of action
attained by the predecessors. From the earliest days of both
MITRE and Aerospace Corporations the sense of urgency that
protected their parent from being criticized for secondary
political and economic considerations no longer existed. From
birth, these companies shared the goldfish bowl of AF dollar
requirement to support R&D and they were looked at by Congres-
sional committee members not as exotic tropical fish requiring
special diet and favorable conditions but as common five and ten
cent store goldfish. The criticism and pressures of Congres-
sional committees caused the AF to react by applying more and
more administrative controls on Aerospace and MITRE. The
mother became overprotective and, in so doing, she may have
smothered her infant.
Research and Development Growth Model:
Professor Edward Roberts of MIT, who has been engaged in
efforts to relate the elements of R&D to some basic framework
stated:
"The apparent presumption that there is no orderliness
to research and development keeps people from looking
for it. If government and industry could be convinced
that a framework basic to the research and development
process does in fact exist no doubt several alternatives
could soon be discovered."
One of the investigations to increase understanding of
the R&D process was described by Gillett Welles, III, a
graduate student working with Dr. Roberts, in his unpublished
Master's thesis. He developed a conceptual framework for
viewing the process and identification of the important
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determinants of success for a R&D organization. His investiga-
tion revealed that the rapid growth of a R&D organization had
the effect of diluting the knowledge held by the organization
and led to a substantial reduction of technical effectiveness.
FIGURE 5
Basic R&D Organization
Advanced Research Product Development Manufacturing
y Y
Knowledge Product Image Hardware
The "primary functions of the R&D organization is to exert
technical effort toward the requirements of awarded contracts
and to deliver the desired results to the customer within a
reasonable period of time".6 The fountain of knowledge that
produced the idea that led to the contract lay in advanced
research. Once a R&D organization began to expand, however,
dollar reward was tied to the manufactured end product. Since
the work performed in advance research was not immediately
effective toward the immediate work requirements, the organiza-
tion reduced the engineering level applied to this area and
pushed their engineering people to product development and
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manufacturing liaison. This shift from advanced research, while
attaining immediate results, left a vacuum of new ideas or
advanced concepts on which the company could build. Welles
found that rapid expansion had "the effect of causing a
decline which persisted for a period of seven to eight years
during which the organization was unable to take advantage of
any new opportunities."7 Unless management was wise enough
and strong enough to keep growth under control the R&D organi-
zation found itself in serious difficulties.
The problems inherent in this description of growth of a
private R&D organization appeared to be applicable to those
faced by the AF and its creations, Aerospace and MITRE, even
though the latter activities were not involved in the production
of hardware. As previously indicated, the military services had
immediate operational problems and their goals emphasized cor-
rection of these problems. In their rapid growth and the need
to get military hardware in the field the AF R&D program em-
phasized short range objectives; partly because such goals
were more easily visualized, partly because success seemed more
certain, and partly because such projects got financial support.
R&D, by its very nature, must be directed toward objectives
often in the future, and as indicated by the Welles' study,
pursuit of this goal required strong management support of
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advanced research. Pressures within the military pushed ad-
vanced planning in the background. Military personnel within
ESD, BSD, and SSD viewed the "payoff" as producing working hard-
ware and the SETD nonprofits found themselves projectized in
system program offices engaged in hardware problem solving.
While the companies recognized the need for "solving unsolved
problems or doing new things with new techniques", as Welles'
defined the aims of advanced research, Aerospace and MITRE
found that, all too often, initiation of such work was delayed
until the need had become so great as to be considered an
emergency. Instead of reacting to the opportunities of weapon
technology, the SETD nonprofits were kept busy reacting to the
problems of what one observer called "premeditated emergencies."
Myth of Special Need:
The most popular explanation of SETD nonprofit creation was
especial need". In Chapter II, quotations by Mr. C. W. Halligan
and Gen. James McCormack Jr. were used which emphasized their
contention that Aerospace and MITRE were created to meet a
special need which could not be fulfilled by government, industry
or universities. The analysis in this study was not intended to
refute this contention; however, the facts presented were suffi-
cient to indicate that this position was overemphasized. In
1958, there were industrial means to do the MITRE job; in 1960
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there were industrial means to do the Aerospace job. The "special
need", as previously indicated, existed in the years prior to the
creation of either MITRE or Aerospace. At that time "special
need", as indicated in Chapter III, was characterized by these
traits: (a) projects of national importance and highestpriority,
(b) extreme urgency, (c) giant technological step, (d) radical
impact on military operational techniques, and (e) concurrency
of development, production and operational preparation.
The initial inquiry of this study was directed at deter-
mining what happened to a R&D organization, such as the SETD
nonprofits, conceived and established to perform a specific
task after the mission was accomplished or greatly reduced in
scope or importance. This study revealed that the SETD non-
profits were never established to perform a specific task;
that their charters of origin and their initial contracts were
broad and general in nature to provide "full resources of modern
science and technology" to the military problems; that their
creation was devised by the AF as a legal "gimmick" to assure
military control of R&D and AF technical competence to retain
their hold on ballistic missile, space and command and control
missions.
Thus, "special need" neither existed at the time of creation
of Aerospace and MITRE Corporations nor exists today. The
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projects and tasks assigned to the corporations from time of
birth to the present have not met the criteria outlined above.
The AF use of these corporations emphasized short range and
immediate technical objectives at the expense of advanced re-
search and made it virtually impossible for these activities to
be the creators of new technology for military use.
In an interview published in 1961, Dr. Donovan, Vice-Presi-
dent of Aerospace Corporation stated:
"For the future, much depends on the international
situation and growth of space technology coupled with
the Air Force use of space. We were created as an agency
to help the Air Force, if the need for us grows we will
accordingly grow stronger, if the need declines we will
shrink or go out of existence. After all, we can be
dissolved much easier than any company with a group of
shareholders."I8
Under the terms of their contract with the AF, the nonprofits
can be dissolved and their assets become the property of the AF.
Dissolution cannot be accomplished as easily as described by
Dr. Donovan. The corporations have established roots and vested
interests. Like any activity, either public or private, they
desire to grow and gain power, and, if this is not possible,
they will fight to exist. Dr. Price described the temptation
in this way:
"We do well to recognize that a government bureau is
tempted to be more concerned with its .wn status and
power than with the purposes of national policy. But
if we entrust these purposes to scientists and industrial-
ists we do not sterilize that political temptation. We
only let it begin to work directly on the industrialists
and scientists. If public ownership is no guarantee
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of unselfishness, neither is private ownership." 9
Today, under AF contract as "captives of the AF", the
SETD nonprofits exist as appendages of bureaucracy. They look
like, act like, and perform like AF activities. As a national
resource of scientific and engineering skill and expertise
they are withering under the ground rules that have been im-
posed on them by the AF. The major concentration of technical
effort is on projects of secondary need and priority. The AF
is using them as a source of manpower rather than as a resource
of great capability to be focused on selected and highly sophis-
ticated tasks. Their use as a catchall for all kinds of jobs
has had an adverse effect on their ability to carry out vital
work.
Changing Forces:
It must be recognized, however, that the problems facing the
SETD nonprofits are symptomatic of a basic difficulty facing
the AF R&D program. After WW II through the Eisenhower adminis-
tration, the emphasis on massive retaliation and strategic deter-
rance made the AF the top dog among the military services. It
received the most money for R&D and during an era of weak DOD
and JCS direction it exercised unusual freedom in action in
deciding how the program would be managed. Today, the strategic
retaliatory force is in being and the emphasis has shifted to
the needs of limited warfare and the mobile and less vulnerable
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Polaris nuclear missile capability.
The AF finds itself in a period of transition looking for
new roles and missions in areas dominated by the Army and
Navy. At the same time R&D decision making and control has
been lodged at DOD rather than at service level. As a result,
it is highly doubtful that the AF will be given sole respon-
sibility for a major program of national urgency and priority
in space, ballistic missiles, or command and control. Thus,
even if the SETD nonprofits were provided the ideal climate
and freedom in which to flourish it is questionable that the
AF could assign to them vital and highly sophisticated tasks
that demanded their expertise and talents.
In the 1950's the services had, within the limitations of
budget and over-all policy, a great deal of autonomy. Weapon
development and procurement were largely decentralized to the
services. In this way, the sole responsibility for the ICBM
program and the SAGE development was assigned to the AF, and
there was no question about the latter's authority and respon-
sibility for decision making on these programs. Today the
picture has changed drastically. Decision making on major
R&D programs has been centralized at DOD level. As Hanson
Baldwin indicated in an article in Foreign Affairs, the
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Office of the Secretary of Defense is "far more than a policy-
making and coordinating agency, as it was originally intended
to be under the National Security Act of 1947; it administers,
operates, contracts, develops, procures and commands.n1 0
The posture statement by Mr. McNamara before the House
Armed Services Committee on the fiscal year 1966-70 defense
program reiterated that no major changes in force structure
were contemplated. Thus, the Secretary implied in words and
program actions that defense armament was in a state of evolu-
tionary rather than revolutionary development. The buying
pattern would be toward product improvement and hardware
modernization rather than new weapons. The previous dis-
cussion revealed that the AF and the SETD nonprofits were
not engaged in programs of national priority and urgency today,
and the recent posture briefing by Mr. McNamara implied that
in the-immediate future there was little liklihood that the
AF would be assigned R&D responsibilities for any new system
that could meet the criteria of "special need".
There was a growing recognition within industry that the
defense market was no longer a growth market,. The recent study
by Arthur D. Little, Inc. (ADL), "Strategies for Survival in
the Aerospace Industry", forecast an overall defense market
decline of 15 percent in the next five years and urged industry
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to seek R&D funds rather than production contracts. The report
stated:
"The Aerospace industry still has a sizable market,
but the pattern has changed significantly. For
example, in 1954 it was predominantly a producers
market, but in 1963 the dollar expenditures devoted
to research and development equalled those allocated
to production; by 1969 the total aerospace research
and development budget will be 60% greater than that
earmarked for production."11
High level industry spokesmen reacted violently to the
ADL Report. Comments of "overly pessimistic"t, "superficial"
and "unrealistic" were noted in the trade publications; how-
ever, the array of statistics and data supported the ADL con-
clusion that a fundamental change in the defense market had
taken place and that there must be a corresponding change in
the overall industry structure.
This investigation supported the industry position that
their capabilities in systems technology and management had
increased substantially. As previously indicated in the ten
year period between 1954 and 1963, the industry invested
more than $2.6 billions in expansion and modernization and
almost all of this capital expansion went toward new research
facilities.
Organizational Conflicts of Interest:
Mr. McNamarats posture briefing, the ADL report, the
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Stanfod Research Institute study can lead to a supposition
that large segments of the aerospace and electronics industry
may divorce themselves from production and consider their
business to be R&D systems management. Under such circumstances,
the position expressed by Mr. Yarmolinsky and described in the
previous chapter, that industrial objectivity was attainable
by contract, would become more meaningful.
In this regard, it may well be that DOD Directive 5500.10
will require revisions and changes to satisfy government, the
industrial community as well as the company that undertakes a
systems management SETD role. During the interviews with
industry, the STL role for the Navy in the anti-submarine war-
fare program was discussed. Industry was cautious about ob-
jecting to a contract that was just starting but they were
concerned about the privileged position STL would have in such
a potentially large program. They were impressed by the hard-
ware ban restrictions reported by Missiles and Rockets and
quoted in the previous chapter. When STL was interviewed, how-
ever, they claimed that the Missiles and Rockets article had
overstated the hardware exclusion clauses of the contract.
They indicated that an STL press release dated December 7, 1964,
clarified their contractual restrictions.
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"In accordance with DOD policy covering conflict-of-
interest, the contract contains a special clause which
precludes TRW corporation from the supply of specific
ASW hardware where related comprehensive tasks in system
analysis and system engineering have been assigned. How-
ever, these restrictions are not imposed for other ASW
hardware items where the related assigned tasks are less
comprehensive."1 2
Many industry executives would be very dissatisfied with the
STL contractual interpretation of conflict of interest. This
was not to belittle the efforts of those who considered DOD
Directive 5500.10 a means by which industry could compete for
work performed by nonprofits today. It may well be that this
is the way of the future; that as defense R&D funds decline or
level off, industry will be willing to accept the restrictions
and learn to live with the directive. The indications, how-
ever, are that revisions and changes will be required to clarify
ambiguities and misunderstandingsthat exist today.
New Role Is Required:
The AFSC fiscal year 1967 program for MITRE and Aerospace
Corporations will soon begin to run its annual obstacle course
through DOD and Congress, and its progress promises to be more
tortuous than in the past. Congressional opposition to SETD
nonprofits has not abated and criticism is now coming from an
increasing number of fence straddlers and even former supporters
who think it is time to put the program on a new footing, or
perhaps, terminate it completely.
The DOD, hoping to appease Congressional, industrial, and
other governmental agency critics has adopted a temporary
policy of status guo, maintaining the key nonprofits at their
present levels and possibly permitting industry to compete
with them for contracts. Dr. Eugene C. Fubini, deputy director
of defense research and engineering, who was assigned the task
of deciding what the nonprofit role should be, was quoted as
follows:
"It is true we can use profit-making organizations to do
technical direction and systems engineering. But this
does not mean that in all cases all the work should be
pushed toward industry. In the nonprofits, we have a
valuable national resource which already exists. We
see no reason to eliminate it simply because it is not
for profit. There is a need for controlling the non-
profits ...
"We do not want them to grow too much or to decrease
too gast. We would like them to stay generally at
the present level. This leveling will be obtained by
maintaining a high quality rather than a high quantity
of work."13
When the ba1isti;c missile program, began the nature of the
total job and the characteristics of industry warranted the
use of a SETD activity on contract to the AF. But "forces at
play" changed in the 19601s. The program was permitted to
evolve year after year, from the early ballistic missile needs
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to serve different objectives under very different circumstances.
The result has been the conversion of organizations with
unusually strong scientific and engineering resources and
first class potential to a sterile, uncreative, and con-
troversial R&D activity. Perpetuation of the status _uo will
not improve the situation; it can only lead to further deter-
ioration. Change is required, but any change that is made by
DOD must not result from appeasement or reaction to pressures
and criticism but "as a result of a well-reasoned, deliberate
appraisal of what their implications might be."
In the previous chapter, Dr. Brown was quoted as saying
that "government policy, like science itself needs to be
conceived and pursued with some regard for its totality as
well as its parts." The role of the SETD nonprofits, if a
role exists, must be considered in terms of the overall defense
R&D program. The outline of :such a program is briefly con-
tained in the final chapter.
CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The initial inquiry of this study was directed at determining
what happened to a R&D organization, such as the SETD nonprofits,
conceived and established to perform a specific task after the
mission was accomplished. The study revealed that the raison
d'etre of SETD nonprofits - that they were created to perform
a special need which could not be fulfilled by government,
industry, or universities - was not supported by historical facts.
Special need existed prior to the creation of either MITRE or
Aerospace Corporation.
The rapid growth pattern of these organizations, created
after the major technological advances in ballistic missiles and
SAGE had been made, indicated that scientists and engineers working
in private institutions establish roots and vested interests and
became more concerned with their "own status and power than with
the purposes of national policy." The expansion of MITRE and
Aerospace Corporations did not take place at the interface of
advanced and innovative technology but at evolutionary rather
than revolutionary developments in ballistic missiles, space,
and command and control systems.
The "special status" position of MITRE and Aerospace Corpora-
tions to the Air Force provided a degree of financial security and
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stability but subjected them to restrictive budgetary and adminis-
trative controls. This position, for all practical purposes,
made them captive to the Air Force. The Air Force use of these
corporations emphasized short range and immediate technical ob-
jectives at the expense of advanced research for longer range
weapon technology. The SETD nonprofits have not appeared to
protest too strongly against military policies and procedures
that have seriously prevented them from making the scientific and
technical contributions they consider themselves capable of pro-
viding.
Although, some of the SETD nonprofit executives stated that
if there was no legitimate need for their services they should
be dissolved, their passive acceptance of restrictions, controls
and assignments of secondary need and priority belied this posi-
tion. Like any actiVity, either public or private, the SETD non-
profits desire to grow and gain power, and, if their existence is
threatened will fight or passively accede to restrictions that may
limit their value but will enable them to exist.
It must be remembered, however, that the basic objective of
defense R&D is national security. As indicated in the Introduction,
when the question is raised - What kind of R&D program will enable
us to reach this objective? - even within the DOD numerous answers
will be found. There are some who argue strenuously that a
plateau in technology has been reached, that the technological
revolution is over; others contend that the pursuit of military
technology will increase world tensions and that political sal-
vation is dependent upon disarmament or arms Limitation.
I contend that the military technological revolution is
far from over and that long range scientific research on military
problems must continue.
Point 1. National security may be dependent upon break-
throughs in weapon technology; therefore, inno-
vative and creative research and development must
be encouraged.
This study proved that the evolutionary process of SETD non-
profit development within the Air Force emphasized short range
and immediate technical objectives and deemphasized that effort
that offered the greatest potential for innovative and creative
scientific and technical development. The captivity of the SETD
nonprofits to the Air Force makes it difficult for their research
staffs to explore freely and objectively and even more trying
to initiate research projects for conceptual phase investiga-
tions of new and, therefore, unpopular ideas.
Today, the SETD nonprofits used by the Air Force have been
converted and absorbed within the military bureaucracy. They
are used primarily as a source of "warm bodies" collecting jobs
of lesser importance, jobs that add little to innovative or
creative defense R&D.
Point 2. The Air Force contracts with Aerospace and MITRE
Corporations should be discontinued on or before
July 1, 1968. This date should permit phasedown
and/or realignment of Aerospace and MITRE as well
as a reconstruction and realignment of Air Force
in-house capabilities.
The situation and conditions during the early days of the
ballistic missile program supported the use of the SETD organi-
zational form. These conditions do not exist today. A major
change has been the development of systems management capabilities
of private industry. One notes that major federal R&D efforts;
e.g., NASA with their responsibilities for space R&D, FAA with
their responsibilities for air traffic control R&D, and the
Department of Commerce with their responsibilities for urban
transportation investigations have not employed a SETD concept.
These agencies employ a strong core of government scientists and
engineers to manage R&D conducted primarily by private industry.
Point 3. There is no legitimate need for nonprofits perform-
ing systems engineering and technical direction
in defense R&D today and in the foreseeable future.
Industry can and should be assigned the major
responsibilities for advanced and engineering
development but under government technical manage-
ment and control.
Since the end of World War II, defense R&D including long
range military research has been under military control. The
military services have controlled the selection of projects that
will be studied and determined funding levels. Serious doubts
have been raised as to the amount of innovation attained, even
with the considerable number of dollars the nation has expended in
the military R&D program. This study does not provide an answer
to the overall question of the effectiveness of the R&D system;
however, it shows that within the Air Force the military emphasis
is directed toward solving immediate weapon problems at the expense
of R&D breakthrough opportunities in weapon technology. This
natural emphasis on the part of the military, clearly outlined by
Dr. Bush in 1946 and discussed in Chapter 2, raises the question:
Question 1. Is there a need to reopen the issue pointed out
by Dr. Bush that long run military research
requires a permanent civilian controlled organi-
zation, funded independently, that has liaison
with the military services but is free to initiate
military research projects on its own?
Since World War II, numerous organizations and management
structures have been created to perform defense R&D. As indicated
by Dr. Stover they were the result of a "host of forces at play
during a particular time - rather than as a result of a well-
reasoned deliberate appraisal of what their implications might
be." The Bell Committee was established in 1961 by President
Kennedy to review the experiences of government in contracting
federal R&D and to determine guidelines or criteria that might
be used in deciding how future programs should be conducted. The
report, although interesting, did not provide answers as to "what
method, when and why" one organizational method might be better
than another. The result is many pieces but no totality to the
defense R&D, and raises the question:
Question 2: Is there a need to reopen the issues raised by
President Kennedy in establishing the Bell Com-
mittee to develop criteria that should be used
in "determining whether to perform a service or
function through a contractor or through direct
Federal operations"?,
Any effort to restudy the issues of the Bell Committee inquiry
would do well to consider the use of MITRE and Aerospace Corpora-
tions, not in a SETD role, but within the R&D structure. The
SETD nonprofits represent a collection of capable and talented
scientists, engineers and R&D managers who have the flexibility
to be applied to problems of national interest.
Point 1 recommended cutting their umbilical cord to the Air
Force, it does not mean that these activities must or should be
dissolved. Their proper role may be with other defense establish-
ments or possibly writhin the larger federal R&D picttre. The
question raised is:
Question 3: Can the DOD find defense tasks of national
importance that can best be done by MITRE or
Aerospace Corporations?
If such tasks exist, MITRE and Aerospace Corporations should
be retained within the defense structure under contract to perform
a specific job or task and not in a "special statust? relationship
with a military service or department. If such tasks do not exist,
defense ties should be broken and the SETD nonprofits dissolved
or permitted to seek other governmental R&D tasks of national
need.
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